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The Relation Between Moral Qualities and Intelligence According to St. Thomas Aquinas

A DISSERTATION

Submitted to the Faculty of Philosophy of the Catholic University of America in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

by

JOSEPH EARL BENDER, A. M.

1924

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

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INTRODUCTION.

Much interest and importance are attached to the relation between moral qualities and intelligence in various branches of human research. Our chief concern lies in the practical inquiries of whether good conduct makes for intelligence and education of mind guarantees morality. Is there any connection between immorality and ignorance? Do good men always think right and are wicked men always ignorant? Experience gives as many answers as it exhibits paradoxes. Upon first sight this may appear to be only an ethical problem, but a closer study discloses it as being both psychological and metaphysical, and as being connected with sociology and education. It is a question of pedagogical, civic and scientific importance. It reaches out into every field of thought and action and is fundamental in many situations not yet analyzed. The results of the investigation can be applied by sociology as a most helpful reference to its subsidiary sciences, all of which are related to the study before us.

The lack of modern literature on the subject has convinced us that scientific research has uncovered no answer to the question and the meager data that we have succeeded in unearthing was free from any philosophical entanglements. A perusal of the more important works of prominent sociologists has revealed few allusions to our subject as we have stated it. Certainly no distinct treatment of the question has been given by modern scientists. Ward states (*The Psychic Factors of Civilization*, p. 106): "if there is any mutual interaction between ethical teaching and moral conduct by which each influences the other and tends to cause the advance of both, it is slight." In a review of Ross' Social Psychology the statement that "virtues grow on an

intellectual stalk'' (p. 56) is the only significant one pertaining to our subject in his entire book, but he does not attempt to explain or account for the attainment of virtue. What they have said has not analyzed our problem although they have inferred in their writings that such a question does exist.

The general principles directing any distinctively Catholic contribution to the solution of the problem must come from St. Thomas Aquinas. Living in the thirteenth century, when civilization was adapting itself to the rapid adjustments of social life, many of which we find mirrored in the problems absorbing the attention of modern sociologists, he was at liberty to study the social situation and offer suggestions for its improvement. His superior intellectuality, sanctity, and the almost universal recognition for seven hundred years, of his scholarly work make him best qualified to open a way for a more complete investigation. We shall not attempt to show present-day scientists that they are right according to St. Thomas, nor to indicate that every modern advancement of opinion will find an anticipation in his doctrines, nor to prove that modern scholarship is wrong because he did not anticipate it, but to reveal in this problem that is yet to be settled by contemporary investigators, that he spoke correctly perhaps without knowing how far his voice carried. Our main purpose in this dissertation is to direct those interested in the difficulties involving modern social situations to his works where they will find helpful suggestions for the solution of the problems that arise from this widely divergent question.

The conclusions we have reached seem to strengthen the tendency to recognize the need of an ethical as well as a psychological basis for the social sciences, while education also derives its share of benefits from the results, particularly those pertaining to moral conduct in the training of the child.

CHAPTER I

Moral Qualities and Intelligence as a Sociological Problem

The science of Sociology was not established by an investigator or by a group of scientists in a short period of time. It is not an entirely new science and much of its subject matter is present in the sciences of philosophy, biology, psychology, history, economics, political science and civics. It exists in the older sciences but is not developed from the modern sociological viewpoint. Men who followed the old line sciences either did not know of the fertile seed that existed there and was capable of cultivation and development, or were content to pursue the accepted fields along traditional lines. But there are always some whose appetites for knowledge can not be satiated by old fashioned systems. They crave more extensive activities. They penetrate more deeply into the caverns of science. And in the case of Sociology they traveled over the exact track as their predecessors but they extended the main line of thinking and finally arrived at a new terminal which they named Sociology. These were the pioneers in the field, the ones who christened the new science. We might compare these men to an inventor who is dissatisfied with the first product of his creative mind and anxiously works on new appliances until he succeeds in turning out a perfect piece of machinery. Sociology is the assembled locomotive, the old sciences were the parts strewn around the workshop waiting for someone to come and set them up.

The ancient sciences have contributed to Sociology, each in its turn, some with a more direct relationship than others. The principal ones are Biology and Psychology.

Biology deals with the general problems of life, as cell structure, heredity, organic evolution and natural selection. It is evident that general biology was one of the basic sciences of Sociology. Concerned with the laws and factors of organic evolution, it inspired many a theory for the explanation of social development and social control. Physiology, the laws of which govern the operations of the individual body, particularly those of the brain and nervous system, and Anthropology, a study of the origin of man and his classification with other animals, are the two special biological sciences that have a direct bearing on Sociology. These sciences have helped to solve many of the social problems in life among which are the social force in heredity and the laws of the increase and decrease of population. The foregoing aspects of life are social. The history of Sociology reveals the connection between Biology and Sociology in the explanation of them.

This relation between the two sciences to all appearances seems direct, but is, nevertheless, auxiliary, for the major portion of all social problems is psychological. The co-operation between individuals comprises the workings of the intellect, the will and the senses. We call these interactions, consciousness, which is the sum total of an individual's personal contact with others. Inter-association of persons, the growth and development of social groups, could be the study of Psychology, these phases of human life being the outgrowth of psychical processes, but they are passed on to the Sociologist since the psychic field and its accompanying problems require the entire attention of the Psychologists. The concern of the Sociologist is with the interplay of individuals and of social processes. Recent developments in Sociology show that while it is the child of Biology and Psychology, the latter, or mental science, is the stronger of the two and contributes most to the

study today. We say this because it is plainly evident that Biology is limited to organic life but Psychology embraces all phases of the conscious experiences of the individual in his relations with other human beings. Sociology has thus resolved itself from a biological to a psychological interpretation (*Ellwood—Sociology in Its Psychological Aspects;* pp. 55-65).

It has been discovered that Biology and Psychology are social sciences both closely allied with Sociology. Our next step will be the subject of relationship between Ethics, another social science, and Sociology. In the consideration of these two sciences we are apt to ask several questions. Does the one contain the other? Could we eliminate one and have the other embrace all that the lost science contained? Are both essential for the existence of each? Statements of those who have dwelt upon this controversy in detail will be interesting. Comte said that because Ethics involved the welfare of human activities it was merely a part of Sociology (*Positive Polity; Vol.* 2, Chap. 7). Others taught that since it was proper for Ethics to delve into every phase of social intercourse in order to dictate the right and wrong of things it was usurping the field of Sociology. These doctrines are too extreme for both sciences have their own separate field in which to penetrate. Ethics is involved in the formation of ideals and in the pronouncing of its judgment on moral conduct. Sociology, we repeat, is the study of *human associations and social groups.* Neither science can be included in the other for the problems of one are sufficiently important to be distinct from the other. We cannot say that one could survive without the other. To pursue the study of group life, its origin and development, without finding disruptions of the moral code or perfections attained in the practice of proper conduct would be not only incredible but impossible. If we trace the whole course

of the science of Ethics which will include laws for right living and ideals to attain we can only find the practical application of these teachings among the social groups. Some contend this is sufficient proof that Sociology is a basic rock upon which Ethics is built. It is more accurate to say that the two sciences are inter-dependent; one overlaps the other regardless of what application is made. Sociology finds its ideal in Ethics and Ethics finds its working principles in Sociology (*Small—General Sociology;* pp. 674-696).

The filial connection of Sociology with Biology and Psychology has been pointed out. Ethics might be acclaimed as a *twin* to the science of Sociology since they are so evenly intertwined, one with the other. But Sociology is related to other sciences also, perhaps not so closely as to the three preceding subjects, but near enough to permit us to place them all in the same family. Political Science, Economics, Education and Civics are the more important social sciences with which Sociology is involved. Their principal content is human social intercourse but each is limited in its treatment. Each is concerned with only one certain part of social life and their summarizations must necessarily be one sided and restricted. This has led to various conclusions on group life, most of them being incorrect and partial because it is only logical that since these special sciences cover a restricted area of the field of society, their results would be less general. The need for a universal social science is here most apparent. Sociology fulfills all requirements in this respect. It embraces all aspects of social interactions. It covers a wider field than any of the other social sciences. It is the fundamental science of all social life and the one in which the special social sciences find their origin and development (*Ellwood—Sociology in Its Psychological Aspects;* pp. 29-32).

The question of the relation between moral qualities and intelligence as a sociological problem, therefore, reaches into Psychology and Ethics from the very nature of the science in its analysis of the social order and some of its practical problems. The social order has many factors which hold a vast influence upon the orderly co-operation of social groups. Among these our chief interest is centered upon moral qualities and intelligence. Morality is the foundation stone of every social organization regardless of the crudity of its makeup. It is the cement that binds together the individuals into a smooth working group. It elevates man to an ideal plane, creates in him a disposition to treat his neighbor after the manner of the golden rule, instills in him a love for virtue and an inspiration to emulate good conduct and high character. At a cessation of the practice of virtuous habits, society could not function and disintegration would follow. We cannot analyze any phase of social life without discovering the truth of this statement. As society increases, moral codes and ethical standards must also be augmented in order that they may go hand in hand with social development. Only in this way will civilization live and be maintained (*Ross—Sin and Society*).

If order in society cannot reign without the guiding hand of morality neither can it exist if aid from the intellect is lacking. The intellect has always been a most potent force in blazing the way for social progress. Intellectual activity of man has placed him in his present advanced stage of leadership. All our success in socialization has been achieved by intelligence. The intellect is the conqueror of nature; the dynamo which supplies the power that enables us to control all forces whether internal or external; the contributing factor in all social advancement. Some Sociologists, among whom are Ward (*Pure Sociology;* pp. 464-479), assert that the in-

tellect, if permitted, will exceed all bounds and is prone to work toward the disruption of organized social life. Persons of a highly intelligent degree who are opposed to all moral and social forces contributing toward the advancement of society to all appearances prove the truth of this assertion. An investigation will soon show that these misfitted intellectuals neglect to consider every phase of society. They, themselves, are not fully socialized intellectually and their view upon life is one-sided and biased. A check or restraint is needed to temper the intellectual action of man and regulate its extreme tendencies. Morality, the norm which directs all our actions in good and proper channels, is the only remedy. Virtuous inclination toward our fellow men with a sympathetic understanding of their problems and difficulties will do more to preserve and develop socialization than any other agency. The combination of moral qualities and intelligence with the constructive elements they offer in maintaining the general system of Sociology is of the most vital importance and cannot be overlooked.

The manifestation of the last sentence is found in the the special social science of Education. The individual has reached a high distinction in the social order through the vehicle of education. In the plastic years of childhood and adolescence education serves as the most influential agent in the formation of strong character and praiseworthy habits. Youth's impressionable years can be utilized to inculcate in him a love for virtue and high ideals. Education is the most powerful of all the special social sciences. Through it social groups make astounding progress. It teaches the individual the correct view of life and furnishes him with a knowledge of the needs of his neighbor. Its lessons prompt him to lend his assistance in the maintenance of the social order and its ethical codes guide him in his way of living (*The Sociolo-*

gical Basis of the Science of Education—Ellwood—Education, November, 1911).

Political Science, the oldest of all the social sciences, is a subsidiary study in Sociology. Organized government is perhaps the most perfect system in the whole social sphere. The union of peoples to form a state has brought socialization to its high development. The power of the intellect and morality over this superior type of social organization is again evident. The intellect has lifted man to his social zenith. Morality, in the form of respect for authority, true patriotism, love of country and an appreciation of the rights of others, preserves the state intact and keeps it functioning properly (*Garner—Introduction to Political Science;* pp. 31-32).

The same principles exist in the science of Civics, a subject that ought to be familiar to every citizen. The youth of today should have a clear knowledge of the rudiments of good citizenship and a sound training in their application, a consciousness of the obligations and responsibilities to the state and the Federal Government. A man's intelligence will decide for him what is proper in the life of a good citizen. His morality, or the definition of right and wrong, will impress upon him the necessity of obedience to all laws, the sacredness of the ballot, and the responsibilities of public office (*Ross—Principles of Sociology*). Briefly stated, perfection in citizenship can only be attained by a love for and the practice of all that is good and true.

The extension of moral qualities and intelligence into the field of Economics places that science in the first rank of the social studies. In the words of Davenport (*Outlines of Economic Theory;* p. 2) Economics "treats of the commercial and industrial activities of men from a standpoint of values and markets." It is concerned with the problems of production and consumption of goods. This is the underlying strata in the social

interactions of individuals. Economics is but a branch of the science of Sociology. Industrial activity is carried on through the social mingling of men. Sociology teaches man everything concerning his proper position in relation to other men, individually or collectively. This only emphasizes the influential power of morality and intelligence over group life and the economist cannot disregard the advantages which Sociology offers for the benefit of his subject (*Anderson—Social Value*).

Many changes occur in the adjustments of the social order but perhaps the most modern and one to which Psychologists are devoting much of their time is the problem of Psycho-Analysis with its accompanying study of complexes. Sociology is also interested in the solution of these problems since the affected person is a member of society and his cure will restore him again to its ranks where he may labor for its constructive principles. Abnormal mental states are usually the result of a sudden jarring of the affective or emotional system due to a number of emotional experiences or a transfixing of the mental state following an emotional conflict. Association neurosis happens when an idea related to the original experience is suggested and brings into play all the mental and physical phenomena in existence when the original experience took place. The patient sometimes suppresses these mental injuries or cannot remember the original experience. If he is guilty of the former he places himself in a position where serious pathological mental conditions may arise. These can be either hysteria, double or multiple personality, or epilepsy. Juvenile delinquency, criminology, insanity and various other unnatural states are the consequences of these severe mental disorders. The subject commits unlawful acts without his being able to give a reason or say the motives that prompted him. These actions produce abnormal complexes stimulated to the extent of pro-

voking frequent attacks of fear or obsessions. By revealing his complexes the subject often discloses his innermost thoughts and actions. It is the task of the Psychologist to discover these complexes and remedy the patient's mental condition. There are certain technical procedures such as hypnosis, the states of abstraction, free association methods, crystal gazing, automatic writing, word reaction or association tests, electrical phenomena, changes in the pulse rate and the analysis of dream life that can be used to tempt the patient into telling his emotional experiences. By this means the resistances are broken, the suppression is swept away, the emotional ideas lose their independent activity and the patient is placed on the road toward normal mental action (*Coriat—Abnormal Psychology*). In effecting a cure the Psychologist has restored an individual to his place in the social order. A Psychologist must be a Sociologist and a true Sociologist must be a Psychologist. Morality and intelligence must be recognized at this juncture. Proper virtuous training of the child in his impressionable years when his intellect is in the stage of development and he is storing up in the hidden recesses of his mind every act, good or bad, that comes within the scope of his experience is a most important requisite. There should be inserted in the decalogue of the education of a child the injunction to teach him not only to admire virtuous habits but also to practice them and in the years of his maturity he will be neither a menace nor a burden to society but a most enthusiastic adherent of social progress.

The problem of modern Sociology involves moral qualities and intelligence in their general relationship with the practical fields of study. The intellect holds sway over all socializing activities. No other controlling force can usurp the power of the intellect. It is the greatest factor in regulating social interactions and in

supplying the motive power for complete social development. Primarily, social origins are the result of instinctive traits. But as human social relations multiply, it is discovered that "more and more the process of living together needs the interference of reason if successful social adjustments are to be made. Social developments and movements in human society take on a preponderating intellectual character. Reflective thought, which probably played such an insignificant role in primitive society, becomes at last the decisive element, because upon it depends the control not only of the forces of physical nature, but also of the feelings and impulses of human nature" (*Ellwood—Sociology in Its Psychological Aspects;* p. 264).

Sociologists also agree upon the influential force of morality to modify the extreme tendencies in social activities. Comte maintained that the disruption of the social order was due to a conflict of ideals (*Positive Philosophy; Book* 7, *Chap.* 2). Ellwood states that socialization today is being retarded by the disagreement of the fundamental ideals and of the right relations between individuals (*Sociology in Its Psychological Aspects;* pp. 275-276). If such a conflict continues no progress can be made in the social order while control of it will be maintained with difficulty. Acceptance of a moral standard defining right and wrong and assisting man in his proper relations with others is the correct solution for this problem. In this manner a harmonious social order can be constructed while Sociology and Ethics with the co-ordination of the other social sciences will overcome this strife among fundamental ideals and define a true aspect of human life.

Saint Thomas Aquinas is the savior in this crisis. His piety, intellectuality, experience and association with every cross section in life proclaim him competent to offer suggestions to correct the situation. His treatises

in the Summa Theologica on the intellectual and moral virtues are most complete in detail while their comprehensiveness and universal appeal qualify them for authoritative references by modern scientists.

CHAPTER II

Saint Thomas in the Field of Sociology

Every eminent exponent of present-day Sociology asserts that if one aspires to understand social life in all its problems and adjustments one must necessarily be a Psychologist and have a thorough understanding of psychical operations. The practice of one science requires the knowledge of another. St. Thomas Aquinas, the foremost Catholic Philosopher and Theologian, made an intensive study of man, both individually and collectively, the evidence of which is found in the conclusions terminating his various treatises. Although the Angelic Doctor tended primarily toward the theological view of life he possessed at the same time a keen insight into the activities and relations of the social man, for, in order to establish his ethical precepts, he had to first familiarize himself with the physical processes of human nature.

Many skeptics and others whose knowledge of the accomplishments of our renowned Doctor of the Church is very limited may maintain that a Dominican monk (*St. Thomas was garbed in such robes*) cloistered in a monastic cell could have had little or no experience with the work-a-day world. They may hold that so prolific a writer as Thomas, his works comprising thirty-four folio volumes in the Vives edition, would have no time to devote to the study of the practical side of life. Another of their arguments may be that a man living in medieval times could not be conversant with the problems of our present twentieth century civilization and his solutions would not be applicable to the sociological difficulties of today.

In the refutation of these objections we will begin by answering the last one first. The historian has acclaimed the thirteenth to be the "greatest of centuries" (*Walsh—The Thirteenth, Greatest of Centuries*). It was during this time that St. Thomas lived and died. The years between 1200 and 1300 have produced more great men than any period in history. It was the age of satellites and St. Thomas appears as the brightest luminary among the whole constellation. A contention that an epoch boasting of so many distinguished personalities would not have had an organized system of socialization is ridiculous. In a perusal of the history of these times we meet such institutions as the hospital, trade guilds, exchange, commerce and education.

The hospital in union with the monastery assumed the leadership in almsgiving and in alleviating the needs of the poorer classes. Every town having a population of five thousand or more was equipped with its own hospital containing a guest house, almshouse and an asylum. They gave refuge to illegitimate children, rearing and educating them. Provision was made for the burying of the unclaimed bodies of the dead. In general, the hospitals of the thirteenth century offered a universal service for the care of mankind and were almost as thoroughly equipped as our present institutions devoted to the relief of the sick and injured.

The tradesmen of the medieval times were both artisans and merchants. They sold as well as produced commodities. Each craft was organized into what was then called a guild (our twentieth century labor unions are modeled along the same plan). There were many different trades but they all had the same identical aim —to prevent those who had not fulfilled the requirements of the corporation from following the trade. A young man aspiring to become a master in any one line of work was first required to spend a year in preliminary

training to show his fitness to enter upon the trade. Five years of real apprenticeship was then necessary, his only compensation being board and clothing supplied by the master for whom he was working. If accepted at the end of that period he became a "journeyman." He then traveled from one industrial center to another, receiving the regular remuneration of his trade, but being employed only by a master and not working directly for the public. When he had completed his specified time of four years he could then submit a sample of his workmanship to the masters. If satisfied with his skill in the particular trade they admitted him to their ranks with all the privileges to which he was entitled. The guilds enacted legislation regulating half-holidays, and stipulated the way in which each trade should be practiced. The working day first consisted of nine hours, afterwards reduced to eight and later to seven. Saturdays, the eves of holy days and holidays were always half holidays. Arbitration was commonly resorted to in those days between the different guilds, masters and journeymen, and strikes were unpopular and rare occurrences. Many problems in the form of accidents, insurance, old age pension, theft, sick benefits, limitation of labor, open shop, wage fixing, price fixing, boycott and working hours confronted the guilds then as they now do our modern labor organizations (*Robinson—History of Western Europe;* Chap. 18).

It is certain that St. Thomas was often a visitor at the charitable institutions, for the holy monk was both kind and sympathetic to all whom he met. We know that his labors brought him into close relationship with the working classes of that day. He became intimately acquainted with all of them and understood clearly their habits, ideals and modes of living.

Money exchange was a most important element in the economic life of the middle ages. The impetus

incited by the increase of trade and industry aroused dissatisfaction with the old habit of bartering one thing for another and the ancient practice was superseded by a system of coinage. The common coins were in gold or silver, the standards being either Venice or Florence. Money making, lending, changing and counterfeiting were carried on then as now. Lending money at a rate of interest was strictly forbidden by the Catholic Church. The Jews were the only ones who could resort to that occupation without fear of condemnation from the Church. The Franciscan Order established *monts-de-piété,* where they supplied money in exchange for someing of equivalent value. They were not permitted to exact interest for the use of their money but they could demand damages for delay in payment. The Italians-*Lombards*—instituted a primitive banking business which increased the usage of bills of exchange and they were also governed by the same rules as the Franciscans in relation to money lending. People possessing a large amount of money—capitalists—could advance sums toward a new project and receive in return for the use of their capital a share in the profits. These practices were looked upon as right and just by those who objected to the requirement of interest and gradually their prejudices became less bitter. Others took advantage of this opening and large commercial companies soon sprang up in Italy and in other countries.

Commerce in the thirteenth century was an absorbing problem. The principal impulses motivating this new industry were religious zeal, the natural pressure of production augmented by international education, the crusades, plentiful labor and a natural desire for discovery. The crusades to the Orient through which the Holy Land was again brought under Christian control were the agencies that did most to hasten the improvement in commercial activities. The Crusaders were al-

ways accompanied by the merchants who supplied the Soldiers of Christ with provisions and enabled them to accomplish their purpose. These merchants returned to Europe with the products of the East. They carried back with them silks, spices, laces, drugs, musk, ivory and pearls. The rapid progress of the southern countries soon attracted the attention of the northern peoples and the rich fabrics and luxurious products of the Orient were tempting bait to the Rhenish merchants who lost no time in establishing trade relations with the Italians and French. France also opened up commercial negotiations with the Mohammedans of Northern Africa. The centers of trade in the thirteenth century, Barcelona, Genoa, Venice, Marseilles, Hamburg and Bremen, still retain their commercial supremacy today. Marco Polo with other seamen made explorations to the far eastern countries of Persia, India and Siam mapping out water routes and lending invaluable aid in facilitating trade transportation between the East and West (*Robinson—History of Western Europe;* Chap. 15-18).

The institution of the University is another achievement of this noted century. In this educational advancement a greater influx of learning was apparent among the laity. About the end of the twelfth and the beginning of the thirteenth centuries teachers had become so numerous in Paris that they organized a union or guild for their own protection. This band was called "universitas;" thus our word, university. Both the King and Pope gave their approval to this newly formed body and it soon began to assume definite shape. In the course of a short time Paris was overflowing with students seeking the advantages of the new institution of learning and the enrollment fluctuated between fifteen and thirty thousand students. Housing capacity became overtaxed and a lack of discipline and organization with a general looseness of morality were the results. A

stricter form of government was enforced by Robert of Curzon and Pope Gregory VII in 1208. The student body was composed of four nations, French, English-German, Picards and Normans. The Spaniards, Italians and Orientals were grouped with the French and the Hungarians, Scandinavians and Poles were included in the English-German class. The President was elected by the Presidents of the four nations. His term extended to six weeks, later to three months and afterwards to three years. The students fell into three groups, those who lived in Seminaries, those residing in Monasteries, and those whose abodes were in the various lodging houses. Men of all ages from fifteen to sixty attended classes. Each selected a Master under whom instruction was given in all subjects. This practice was followed until Aristotle's methods were introduced and learning was then divided into different faculties. The mendicant orders became members of the faculties about 1250 and from that time the University gradually grew better in its organization. Books were rarely used because the exorbitant prices prevented students from acquiring them. The libraries of Les Chappelles, Hotel Dieux and Sorbonne were the avenues of knowledge to which the students had recourse in their search for information. About this time other universities came into existence, one at Bologna where law was the chief study and others at Oxford and Cambridge, while many more were established in France, Italy and Spain. According to all indications Paris was the finishing school of the world and the principal center of learning.

The most brilliant scholar in attendance at the University of Paris was the Dominican, Thomas. He was a part of the University when it was in its experimental stages. He knew his fellow students, rich and poor, some living a life of luxury, others eking out a bare existence. He brushed elbows with all kinds, at the

lectures, in the libraries and on the streets. Who can say that a man possessing the scholarly intelligence of St. Thomas would have failed to observe the activities of the various social groups that came within the range of his existence?

Critics have said that so voluminous a writer as St. Thomas must necessarily neglect the intensive study of society. Tasks that would have paralyzed the ordinary mind were tackled and performed by the Angelic Doctor with very little exertion. While a student he must have read every book of importance on the subjects of Philosophy and Theology, and one of the rare gifts with which God endowed him was to understand at once everything that he saw and never forget anything that he had read. Some may doubt our assertion but a reference to the life and work of the Saint and of the achievements crowded into a comparatively short period of years will be convincing proof of our statement. The learned man was occupied with tasks other than literary throughout the day. He taught, he traveled, he studied. These interests were given over to hours which many believed were devoted to writing. After night had descended and had terminated his physical labors he would collect his thoughts and hour after hour dictate to several amanuenses the doctrines which the Catholic Church now holds up for study and guidance (*Butler—Lives of the Saints;* Vol. 1, pp. 523-533). We shall discover the nature of his daily occupations in the answer to the next objection.

The principal contention of modern objectors to the sociological writings of St. Thomas is that a monk sequestered in his cell could not be conversant with the problems of the outside world. The real truth reveals St. Thomas never to have been a recluse. From the time he entered the University of Naples until his death he could claim no place as his permanent residence. He

was continually moving from one center to another where his interests called him. A brief outline of his itinerary will suffice to show the extent of his journeys and the different phases of life he was at liberty to study. He spent three years as a student at the University of Paris under Albertus Magnus before assuming the duties of the teaching profession. His pedagogical work kept him in Paris four years, but during that time he made many trips to Italy. In the course of the next ten years he accompanied the Popes on their tours of Italian cities as a member of the Roman Curia. During the reigns of Popes Urban IV, Clement IV, and Gregory IX he traveled throughout Italy delivering lectures at their requests. Following the consummation of this mission he spent four years teaching at the Universities of Paris, Bologna and Naples. When that assignment was completed he resumed his travels lecturing in all the Dominican Houses of study in Italy. With St. Bonaventure and Albert the Great he was chosen to represent the religious orders before Pope Alexander IV. The Pope was so impressed with his brilliance and religious ardor that he selected him to write the "Contra Impugnantes Religionem Dei." The first program of real university study is believed to be the work of his brilliant mind. It was compiled at the Chapter of Valenciennes in 1259. When the General Chapter convened at London in 1263 he was present as the representative of the Roman Province, and six years later acted in the same capacity at Paris. At the time when the Dominican Schools were being organized as centers of learning it was St. Thomas who was called upon to draw up and systematize the courses and methods of instruction (*Turner—History of Philosophy;* pp. 343-347. *Vaughn—St. Thomas of Aquin*).

This is only a brief outline of the scholarly endeavors of the Doctor. He was commissioned many times by

both Kings and Popes as their envoy on diplomatic missions. The holy King Louis regarded St. Thomas in such high esteem that he always consulted him in questions concerning affairs of state so as to fortify himself with the advice of the learned teacher before settling disputes in court proceedings (*Butler—Lives of the Saints; St. Thomas*). There was always a place for him at the diplomatic tables when problems involving international peace were being solved. Being a descendant of royal ancestors, possessing extraordinary knowledge, having an insight into the practical difficulties of his day through his educational and political contacts, displaying disinterested tact and religious impartiality, he was most eminently fitted to offer his opinions and advice in both civil and ecclesiastical negotiations.

In a short résumé of the age and labors of St. Thomas we have seen the transition period through which the countries of western Europe passed and how they arose to meet the exigencies of the times. Only a people conscious of the ever-changing elements in the procession of the years and having the desire to advance with the times could have successfully rode upon the rising tide of civilization. They understood the demands of the period in all its flourishing grandeur and they met these demands by safely launching the ship of civilization upon its journey toward the glorious horizon of enlightenment and progress.

In the midst of this surging sea of life St. Thomas moved and lived. We are cognizant of the important part he played upon this glistening animated stage. We know him as a student, teacher, preacher, organizer and diplomat. His travels from country to country, city to hamlet, brought him into association with all classes and groups. Experience through contact enabled him to study the needs of the people. There was no phase in life with which he was not familiar. Can anyone charge

that he was not qualified to suggest remedies for the quieting of ecclesiastical, social and political upheavals? Many problems of the thirteenth century present themselves in striking similarity to the difficulties of our own day. No further proof is necessary to show that in the writings of St. Thomas modern Sociologists will find many helpful articles presenting solutions for the problems of society. His principles were directed at practical interests but his work in social philosophy was only secondary to his theological view of life. He was governed by a moral purpose in his study of human conduct, individual or social, and he analyzed human action in terms of virtue and sin. He aimed to instill into his readers a sense of appreciation for the dictates of right reason, a consciousness of the end and purpose in life, and a knowledge of good and evil, of virtue and vice.

CHAPTER III

The Range of Our Subject in St. Thomas

The relation between moral qualities and intelligence must have been close to the interests of Aquinas. The importance that he attached to the question is evidenced by the constant repetition of it throughout his works and the continued presentation of new evidence on the different phases of the problem. An even more striking proof of the association in which he united moral qualities and intelligence is offered by his own career. The purpose of this chapter is to show the range of the subject in the works of St. Thomas, the emphasis of it in his own life and in the aim of his writings.

Scholars have rallied last year to celebrate the sixth centenary of the canonization of Thomas as saint of his church. All the great Catholic universities of the world conducted fitting exercises in commemoration of the event. Their professors vied with one another to produce works explanatory of the genius and piety of the man. An enlightening array of facts have been presented and many well-known features of the Saint's life have been brought out in a new light. The most constantly repeated assertion of all of these symposiums has relation to the marvelous combination of moral qualities and virtue in Aquinas. This is particularly interesting in view of this dissertation. Within his church Aquinas is recognized as one of the most preëminent intelligences of all time. And even outside his church where his work is known, there is an ever-widening circle of recognition of his wonderful intellectual ability. The fact that the teaching of his philosophy and theology has been either commended or commanded by nearly eighty Popes is sufficient evidence of the genius of the man. His

canonization proves his heroic morality in an age when university life was not conducive to good morals. It is significant to note that the centenary of his canonization and the literature it has occasioned betray the amazement that is felt by modern scholars over the union of intelligence and morality to such a degree to warrant St. Thomas being called "the most learned of the saints and the holiest of the doctors." The life of the learned saint gives an answer to one of the problems connected with our study of the relationship between moral qualities and intelligence. They are not incompatibles. They existed at the same time in him from the beginning of his days until his death in a most outstanding way. The other problems in connection with this relationship call to the works of St. Thomas rather than to his life. It is evident that the practice of virtue aided thinking in his own case. But he was an exception, a saint. What does he prescribe for the rest of men? In the laboratory of his own soul he had treated the theories he proposed and he offered nothing to others that he thought useless. Did he recognize the varient interactions of morality and intelligence? Is this problem important in his writings? In the great purpose of his activity and in the written record of this purpose did he express any appreciation of the relation between intelligence and morality? It is already recognized that he was not a prophet and he was not writing with a full knowledge of the sociological, ethical and educational problems of this day. The general importance of the teachings of Aquinas will be interesting, since he lived what he taught and taught what he lived. While his writings are singularly free from any reference to himself, to Albert the Great, his closest friend, and to the immediate social problems of his time, we know that he was familiar with them and that if any personality in history is to be called upon to explain how moral qualities, which he calls

virtues, help intelligence and how understanding assists virtue St. Thomas represents the intellect and the tested morality that answers the call. It is evident that he lived as he wished others to live. He lived as a most intelligent man would desire others to live. His life radiated moral qualities, intelligence and subservience to human welfare. If then he taught as he lived, the purpose of his writings, as well as their general content, will show whether for other people as well as for himself there is a connection and a mutual assistance between moral qualities and intelligence.

St. Thomas seemed to have the definite purpose of showing the help piety and intelligence could lend each other. The people of his time called him an intellectualist. He was the rationalist of the thirteenth century and his support of the intellect against the non-intellectual programs of that period plunged him into constant difficulties from which only his piety rescued him. The point to be emphasized here is that he recognized the constant need of the emancipation of thought from tradition and that while the customs of the people were to be respected, their morality required the guidance of more thoughtful and enlightened intellects.

If the writings of Thomas are an indication of his life, then God is the beginning and the end not only of his own activity but of all men. The plan of his greatest work, "Summa Theologica," is modeled on the idea that the seriousness of life comes from realizing that we have emanated from God and the earnestness of life from the fact that we must return to God. This is the mission of the "Summa Theologica," the synthesis of his life's work and the sublimation of all his writings. The problem of intelligence and morality, as it runs through the works of St. Thomas, is that of harnessing, by intelligence, of all the powers of man for the inevitable drive to God. His preaching, teaching and writing is so free

from any appeal to the emotions that one is likely to think him ignorant of human passions. But he had a remarkable knowledge of the emotions for he constantly urged the function of self control and the value of close teamwork between moral qualities and intelligence. He believed the whole process of life was to subserve our conduct to the knowledge that we are separated from our Creator and we must be reunited with Him. Thus are knowledge and virtue joined in the purpose of his writings and so the aim of his work indicates in general the connection between moral qualities and intelligence.

In his treatment of this combination St. Thomas is constructive and since we are searching for his point of view and not endeavoring to exploit our own, this is important. He always analyzes virtue first and considers vice incidentally. We wish that he had given us an explanation of the paradox that is evident in the lives of those who are brightest intellectually when they have, through drugs or liquor, abandoned moral qualities. But these factors which he recognizes individually and socially are only incidental to his general purpose of showing how intelligence and virtue can conspire to lead men back to God from whom they know they came. He is writing for those who wish to think right, and therefore, live right, or for those who wish to live right, and therefore, think right. Whatever be the angle of vision we take, St. Thomas is directing all things to God and is ruled in his consideration of the intelligence and of the virtues by his desire to place men on the right road that will find true happiness or the Divine Presence. This is why one finds virtue discussed primarily and vice only secondarily. His own personal moral heroicity made him constructive in that he ignored the immoral conditions of an age that is unsurpassed in both virtue and vice in order to concentrate on the upbuilding rather than on the upbraiding of people.

The wider the knowledge and the deeper the appreciation of the works and the purposes of St. Thomas the more unshakable will be the notion that he looked upon virtue or morality as an aid to real intelligence, or the understanding of the eternal values of life. He is continually propounding virtue as the means to the highest happiness—the intellectual understanding of God. Understanding does not coerce conduct because the will is free, even against the appeals of virtue and for things alien to God. When St. Thomas speaks of the devil and his temptations, of heredity and its power, he deplores the inability of human nature to raise itself through virtue to what the knowledge of its origin and its destiny justify. If it is permitted to express the attitude of the Angelic Doctor in the words of this dissertation we believe it is the constant purpose of his writings to show that moral qualities aid clear understanding, and intelligence of clear understanding shows the helpfulness of virtue. Repeated readings of his writings betray this fact of importance not only to the study of the individual but also to the study of society.

Just as St. Thomas is a constructionist in his analysis of individual conduct so is he a constructionist in his teachings of what we today call social control. In private and social conduct he demands submission to divine law and to church tradition as representative of that law. He presumes the identity of individual and social conduct in the pursuit of happiness. Thus, with God in mind, he is constructive. Social progress is measured by individual happiness and this is always controlled by our knowledge of what God demands and by the virtue that helps us to meet those demands. St. Thomas gives precedence to virtues over vices. He begins with virtue or moral quality as the fundamental postulate of social welfare and ends with virtue after he has revealed his viewpoint.

This explains why we are so positive in our position that virtues help intelligence in the individual and the state. Were he viewing life from the more sordid angle, were abnormal or criminal psychology his point of survey, and were psycho-analysis and its advantages known to him, his conclusions might be more easily understood and more readily accepted today. But St. Thomas does not claim this as his vantage point in the field. We submit his teaching from his viewpoint. We can merely point out some leads that he offers for those in modern study who resort to his principles for an answer to questions that case investigation cannot solve.

Neither is it possible to give a complete enumeration of the problems of modern psychology and sociology that knock at the door of Thomistic teaching either in challenge or in supplication. There are several points upon which we insist. St. Thomas could have answered, but is not to be thought useless because he did not solve all the problems relating to moral qualities and intelligence. He is not to be considered a destructionist because he did not attack the problem of intelligent control of vice from that standpoint. It has not been shown that the hideousness of vice is a more coercive motive than the attractiveness of virtue in individual and social consciousness and understanding. Aquinas chose virtue as his earliest companion. In his life it was supreme. Naturally it would remain supreme in his philosophy. Naturally from right living he sought to show the consequences of right thinking. This was the tenor of his life and the subject of his thoughts. In this he displayed his constructiveness.

The problem apparently remained permanent in his mind. The vast range of his works is more extensive than modern scholars could hope to cover. He devotes special treatises to the question of moral qualities. In these he outlines the peculiar relationship of morality

and intelligence in their individual and social bearings. In scarcely any of his treatises is this fundamental idea of his character and purpose forgotten. He may not be thinking of the question "in particular," but in the undercurrents of his mind its importance is never lost or sacrificed in the interests of the marvelous order he brought out of the chaotic problems his day was forced at all times to face.

The following is a list of the widely separated tracts, written at different periods of his life, in which Aquinas mentions the relation of morality and intelligence. These show the problem to be basic in his cosmic system and it really became to him a habit of the mind as he grew older.

1. The Summa Theologica in which besides his several treatises on the virtues he has constant references to the question as it is allied to others.

2. The Contra Gentiles where the problem is presented in a philosophical manner and without the theological shadings characteristic of the Summa.

3. His letter to students.

4. His special treatise on the virtues called "De Virtutibus."

5. His politico-moral treatise on government called "De Regimine Principum."

6. In many of his commentaries on the works of Aristotle.

7. In almost all of his commentaries on the books of the Sacred Scriptures.

8. In his commentaries on the works of Peter Lombard.

9. In a special letter on truth called "De Veritate."

The extent of the question and its wide range in his writings may be clearly seen. It indicates the need for brevity and synthesis in the investigation to which this dissertation is given. We are attempting to show that this modern sociological problem is extensively analyzed by St. Thomas and that a more specialized study of it will discover in him an almost inexhaustible mine of sources.

The universality of this question in the compositions of Aquinas is even surpassed by the amazing variety of viewpoints that he defends. The principal element in virtue is choice (2-2*ae, Q.* 134,*a.* 3, *ad.* 4), and wherever there is a special impediment to reason there is need for a special virtue (2-2*ae, Q.* 149, *a.* 1). Virtue in the passions is nothing more than their habitual conformity with reason (1-2*ae, Q.* 56, *a.* 4). There is such a thing as fictitious virtue (*Opusc.* 20, *lib.* 4, *c.* 18), and it can be judged by its selfishness. In the miser are found splendid examples of counterfeit virtues, his prudence in thinking out new loans, his justice, when in the fear of grave loss he condemns theft, his temperance, in which through stinginess he curbs his appetite, his courage, by which he braves all dangers to save his money (2-2*ae, Q.* 23, *a.* 7).

These citations and the succeeding general survey show the space devoted to our particular question by St. Thomas.

Reason is the root of all virtues (*De Virt. Q.* 1, *a.* 4, *ad.* 3). The object of one virtue is the end of another (1*a, Tim, lec.* 2). Sensuality and sensuousness must have relation to thought and the moral virtues around which they hinge must have relation to the mind (2, *d.* 24, *q.* 2, *a.* 1).

St Thomas did not separate virtue from life for he knew how life ought to be lived. The intellectual virtues entirely exclude falsehood but moral virtues may exist along with error (2-2*ae, q.* 1, *a.* 4, *ad.* 3). Virtues do noth-

ing more than help us to follow, as we should, the inclinations of nature (2-2*ae*, *Q.* 108, *a.* 2). We have aptitude to all virtues by nature (1-2*ae*, *Q.* 51, *a.* 1). This statement is of especial interest to reformers, preachers and students of child life. It must be important since Thomas has stressed it so frequently in different parts of his works. His devotion to the fundamental soundness of nature, as evidenced by this principle, can be found eleven times in the Summa Theologica, four times in the Contra Gentiles, and in the following isolated places; *De Malo, Q.* 5, *a.* 5; *De Virtutibus, Q.* 1, *a.* 8; *Job, lect.* 10; *De Veritate, Q.* 11, *a.* 1; *Matth.* 4; *Galat.* 5. With the Angelic Doctor there was great hope for the construction of citizenship because all men have natural virtues and virtue naturally.

Aquinas contended that virtue can socialize even isolation and loneliness, for the good man converses with delight to himself in considering the memory of his virtuous acts, the determination to continue them and the hope of increased moral qualities (3, *d.* 29, *a.* 5, *ad.* 6).

The practice of virtue is also socializing because it leads to companionship with God and likeness to Him (*Con. Gen.* 1, *c.* 92). The goodness of God is similar to the righteousness of moral virtue in us (*De Verit. Q.* 5, *a.* 1, *ad.* 12).

The interplay of virtues is given much attention by the Angelic Doctor. One can first judge where virtue exists from its external manifestations (3, *d.* 9, *Q.* 1, *a.* 1, *ad.* 2). This principle is far reaching and important in the works of the Saint and forms the basis of his analysis of hatred, affability, friendship, love, goodness, charity, penance and contrition. An act is said to be really virtuous when reason directs it to an honest end (2-2*ae*, *Q.* 147, *a.* 1). In the moral judgment of the righteousness of a man his general reliability is not to be estimated by one virtue alone (4, *d.* 15, *Q.* 2, *a.* 1, *q.* 2). St. Thomas lays much stress on this principle in his study

of character and uses it constantly in his explanation of grace, incontinence, fasting, law and liberality where he alludes to the fact that one virtue may often conceal a vice. A man does not have to possess every moral quality in order to be credited with one. One virtue may spring from another in many ways and may naturally create, conserve and dispose the way for another (2, *d.* 44 *Q.* 2, *a.* 1, *ad.* 6).

The comparison of virtues in different people is an interesting phase in the doctrine of St. Thomas on his subject of moral qualities and intelligence. He holds that the virtues of some people can be the vices of others when they are not proportioned to their state of life (1-2*ae*, *Q.* 94, *a.* 3, *ad.* 3). A certain liberality and reasonableness should be shown in demanding moral qualities in persons and special attention and concession must be given to the time and the place in which they live (*In Rom.* 10, *lec.* 2). There may be particular situations when there is no need for the insistence of a certain virtue. Principle is not to be surrendered but local conditions and common sense should be kept in mind. The same virtue is not equal in one man at all times nor in different men at the same time. This principle is often repeated in the Summa Theologica, in the Commentary on the Sentences of Peter Lombard, in De Malo and in De Virtutibus.

While the subject will come up later for more definite answer it is well to know here the general classification of the virtues as they are given by Aquinas. Theological virtues are the causes of all others (1-2*ae*, *Q.* 63, *a.* 3). This is one more instance of St. Thomas's appreciation of the fundamental purpose of life—to lead us to God. Subordinate to the theological virtues are moral virtues, natural virtues, acquired virtues, cardinal virtues and infused virtues. Natural virtues are superior to acquired

virtues but inferior to infused virtues from the standpoint of human effort (1-2*ae*, *Q.* 63, *a.* 2, *ad.* 3).

The general relation of the moral virtues with intelligence can be summed up in these universal principles taken from scattered places in the works of the Angel of the Schools. Moral qualities are more necessary to human life than intelligence (1-2*ae*, *Q.* 66, *a.* 3, *ad.* 1). Moral virtues are more permanent than intellectual virtues as far as action is concerned but not from the viewpoint of purpose (*In Eth., lec.* 16) (1-2*ae*, *Q.* 53, *a.* 1, *ad.* 3). This is evidence of the law that while men ought to be more alert to the acquisition of higher habits they respond more readily to the lower ones. St. Thomas recognizes that a man may be called good if he is morally virtuous even though he be not intellectually virtuous (*De Virt. Q.* 1, *a.* 7, *ad.* 2). A man with a full knowledge of divine things may be concerned with material interests just as a monk with all divine virtues may resort to material revenues to sustain his own nature and help others (*Con. Gentes,* 3, *c.* 133). An interesting distinction that St. Thomas draws between intellectual and moral virtues is the effect the intellectual virtues have on the ability or faculty of acting well and the actual performance of good actions by moral qualities (*De Virt. Q.* 1, *a.* 7). Moral virtue is the projection of right reason into the appetites or emotions, right reason being controlled by the intellectual virtues (*De Virt. Q.* 1, *a.* 12, *ad.* 16). This is another of the favorite principles that St. Thomas repeats so often and which he calls to his rescue in the explanation of affection, friendship and love. It is one that would be basic in a collection of the social principles of Aquinas. The intellectual virtues of wisdom, intelligence, science, prudence and art (*De Anima,* 16) must regulate moral virtues because of the danger of becoming vices through excess (2-2*ae*, *Q.* 20, *a.* 1, *ad.* 2).

CHAPTER IV

Moral Qualities and the Purposes of Social Life

The relation between moral qualities and intelligence has a fundamental connection with many sociological problems and is intricately involved with basic interpretations of social purposes. It is more than a conjecture to say that there will be as many different answers to the question before us as there are attitudes toward the individual in his relation with society. Especially since the question of virtues and intelligence is bound to be so deeply ethical, and because it is ethical it is forced to postulate a declaration of attitude on the equipment of the individual for society and the purposes of this equipment. Our problem is a practical one since there evidently must be a relation either of conflict or harmony between sociology and morality and the Thomistic union of intelligence and moral qualities (*La Conflit de la Morale et de la Sociologie—Simon De-Ploige*). We are presenting the views of St. Thomas on the connection of virtue and intelligence and these views cannot be thoroughly understood, where a man is formulating a cosmic system of thought, unless his analysis of the subject matter be understood and unless the teleology of the individual be appreciated.

It will make for a better understanding of the preceding chapters and will clear up possible misconceptions of the elaborations that will follow if St. Thomas's understanding of the social nature of man be explained. While much of this doctrine has been presented before, it has never been fully explained. Furthermore, even his social opinions that have been well aired take on a new interest in relation to the problem of virtue and intelligence.

According to St. Thomas human nature is essentially social. Man is social and political naturally. This does not mean that he is merely a state builder. He would cease to be human if he did not instinctively socialize himself. This characteristic accounts for his dislike for living in solitude or being isolated from the multitude. The desire for companionship arises from blind instinct and is not acquired through reason. St. Thomas says that the man who lives alone is either a beast or a saint. When man seeks out his fellow men in society he is perfecting that nature which God has bequeathed him (2-2*ae*, *Q.* 188, *a.* 5).

This intermingling in society is necessary for man to complete the three social aspects of his nature—physical, mental and moral. "It is entirely impossible to man that he should need absolutely no one. Every man needs first of all Divine assistance, secondly, human assistance, since every man is naturally a social animal because *he is not self-sufficient for life*" (*Eth.* 1, *lec.* 1). Thus does St. Thomas destroy individualistic philosophy of society and make socialization an answer to individual physical, mental, moral and spiritual needs. To sustain himself in life man needs many things which he cannot obtain with his own hands. It is natural then for him to unite himself with the multitude so that it may be the means by which he can live well (*Contra. Gen.* 3, *Chap.* 3). Nature provides man with only a few things necessary for life but she equips him with reason, the great motive power which aids him to supply himself with the things he lacks at birth, such as food, clothing, etc., for the securing of which one man alone is not sufficient (*Contra. Gen.* 3, *Chap.* 128). It is possible for other animals to live a solitary life but man's organic and animal desires make him social because these organic instincts have been brought under the domain of reason in the human individual. St. Thomas insists that this

dependence on society is one of the earliest penalties of intelligence and helps to develop it. His "organic urge," necessitating thought and speech, is at the root of man's socializing instincts. Living in a multitude more than other animals, natural necessity encourages man to class himself as a social and political animal. For other animals nature has prepared food, clothing, defense, such as teeth and horns, or even speed for flight. The human animal, man, alone cannot provide these things. Other animals have an innate natural instinct that assists them to determine what is useful or harmful, as the sheep naturally judges the wolf an enemy. They instinctively know certain medicinal herbs that will benefit them. But man is endowed with only a vague general knowledge of the necessaries of life and must employ his reason to deduce from these universal principles the knowledge of singular things that are helpful. One man cannot arrive at this knowledge through reason. He must make himself a member of the multitude whose members help each other in the various fields of investigation as medicine, law, etc. Speech is the exclusive agent which conveys these *concepts* or *ideas* from one person to another. Other animals express their passions but man expresses his ideas (*De Reg. Princ. lec.* 1, *Chap.* 1). It is significant that the Divine mind noted man's shortcomings and provided him with reason so that he could take his place with others socially.

Man's mental development likewise makes him necessarily and naturally social. The human mind as well as the body has its limitations according to St. Thomas. A limited mind when presented with a problem necessary for proving the truths of life is impotent and alone. Very few minds working singly ever arrive at the truths necessary for life and then only after an extended period of time and encountering many errors (1*a*, *Q.* 1, *a.* 1). Where men have divorced themselves

from social contact with the outside world their mental development has ceased. Still another proof that man needs the society of others.

Moral development with physical and mental requires intermingling with others. There is a natural aptitude for virtue in man but training is required to attain perfection of virtue. We have learned that man receives assistance in securing food, clothing and other necessities. His reason and hands are the tools which nature has given him but she has been more generous with other animals in supplying them with a full complement of natural gifts to meet their wants. St. Thomas states "it is difficult to see how man could suffice for himself in the matter of moral training since the perfection of virtue consists chiefly in withdrawing man from undue pleasures to which, above all, man is inclined, especially the young who are more capable of being trained. Consequently, man needs to receive this training from another whereby to arrive at the perfection of virtue. As to those young people who are inclined to good acts of virtue by their goods acts of disposition or of custom or by the gift of God, paternal training suffices which is by admonitions. But since some are found to be depraved or prone to vice it was necessary for such to be restrained from evil by force and fear . . . and thus become virtuous" (1-2*ae*, *Q.* 95, *a.* 1). Two things are essential if man is to lead a good life. The first and most important is virtuous action, by which he lives well, the other is secondary but instrumental to the first, namely, a sufficiency of corporeal goods which are necessary for man if his actions are to be virtuous (*De Reg. Prin.* 1, *C.* 15).

Man is the best of the animals if in him is perfected virtue to which he has a natural inclination. But if he is without law and justice he is the worst of the animals. Aristotle proves our statement thus; "injustice is so

much more cruel as (in the degree) that it has arms—instruments for working evil. Prudence and virtue belong to man by nature and are essentially ordained to good; but when man is bad he uses them as so many arms to work evil; thus by astuteness (prudence) he excogitates divers frauds and by abstinence he is made fit to bear hunger and thirst and thus endure longer in malice'' (*Polit.* 1, *lec.* 1).

The moral together with the intellectual and physical natures comprise a social and political being. This is the teaching of St. Thomas. Thomas Hobbes, the first of the English sensists (The Leviathan) denied that man is a political being. He maintained that in the beginning man was prone to war among his fellows, possessed a selfish, perverse and cowardly nature, impregnated with the spirit of rivalry and never inclined to socialization until he discovered that constant strife, besides being detrimental to life and property, also impaired progress. All individual rights were invested in the supreme and absolute authority of the state, a complete transference and renunciation of private rights. Even conscience and religion were subject to the absolute authority of the ruler who was the arbiter of right and wrong in the moral order and of true and false in religious belief. This social compact states that the process of civilization was undertaken only as a last resort. When Hobbes said that man had free will but lacked intelligence he gave us a development of animal society and disregarded the natural rights and endowments of man which make for social restraints and control.

Materialistic interpretations of this nature are most misleading and should be discarded but comparisons between animal egregiousness and human society are important when made by those who have a strong belief in the moral and intellectual superiority of man, such as,

De Kirwan in his "L'Homme Animal et L'Homme Sociale."

Jean Jacques Rousseau, the French materialist, was an advocate of the individualistic point of view in religion, philosophy and politics and urged a return to primitive feeling and to the state of nature (*Turner—History of Philosophy*, p. 504). His description of man was that of a lazy, solitary, comfort loving, self-sufficient individual possessing a free will and virtuous mind but lacking ambition and having no radiating impulses. Man's spirit of inventiveness was the only agency bringing him into contact with his neighbor (*Contrat Social*). This was the force from which our modern society has developed.

The philosophy of society is represented not alone by materialists, two of whose doctrines we have just outlined, but by those who recognize the value of revealed truth in social study among whom we find Dr. Grasset in his work "Morale Scientifique devant la Sociologie," and Paul Bureau teaching "L'Indiscipline des Moers." Bureau's book shows that social control is dependent on individual control in as much as national difficulties are occasioned by individual difficulties and the morality of a nation decreases when the individual standards of judgment (intelligence) are weakened. The entire content of this very enlightening exposition may be summed up in the foregoing citation. De Kirwan's whole proposition in "L'Homme Animal et L'Homme Sociale" makes charity a social virtue intimately involved with modern problems of unemployment, vagabondage and thirteenth century mendicity, and new forms of charity as a moral quality have a practical bearing on present-day social advancement.

The materialistic teachings of both Hobbes and Rousseau—that society is not innate in man but that he must dwell in socialization against his will—are so

widely different from the doctrine of St. Thomas that a comparison of them will be of interest not merely from a sociological standpoint but from a philosophical angle as well. The Angelic Doctor states that the individual and society are two distinct elements both in being and in action. Though they are distinct they are also inseparable and are united by order and relation (1*a*, *Q.* 31,*a.* 1, *ad.* 2) (*Eth.* 1, *lec.* 1) (*De Potentia, Q.* 3, *a.* 16, *ad.* 16). Social man possesses a vegetative nature from which proceed the bodily functions of nutrition, growth and generation. Many social actions can be traced to one of these three operations which are at the base of all economic and aesthetic life (2-2*ae*, *Q.* 114, *a.* 2, *ad.* 2). In the sensitive or sensile life of man are two impulses, cognitive and affective. All the other sources of man's activities emanate from these various impulses (*See Classification of Sources of Action*—Chapter VI). This summarizes St. Thomas's idea of man, a great contrast between the pictures painted by Hobbes and Rousseau, who disregarded man's soul or mind and gave little or no attention to his intellect. They instilled a selfish nature in man. St. Thomas finds a general altruistic trend in him. He states that society is a grouping of men for the obtaining of a common end and that two purposes are involved, the common good of the *individual, not isolated, but associated,* and the common good of *society* as a collective body. Man enters society to perfect himself which makes the purpose of every social group the perfection of each socius. In this sense society is subordinated to the individual (*Eth.* 1, *C.* 1). The common good is, therefore, the purpose of society, but the common good as distributed to all and each. Consequently, the aim of society is the general distribution of means for the satisfaction of individual wants (1-2*ae*, *Q.* 39, *a.* 2, *ad.* 2). The good of the multitude is the purpose of society over that of the individual

because the social organism aims to protect and conserve its own unity (*Ibid*). In the beginning the group is sought simply as a means for personal development, that is, the group is the "finis quo" and the personal development is the "finis cuius gratia" (1, *Q.* 50, *a.* 3). The good of the species takes precedence over the good of the individual, an imperfect thing in the community in relation to a perfect thing as a part of an entirety or a whole (2-2*ae*, *Q.* 64, *a.* 2). We find, then, that St. Thomas epitomizes man as a social being to be truthful, trustworthy, obedient, law-abiding, friendship-loving and educated, possessing christian charity and an understanding of the sacraments (1*a*, *Q.* 96, *a.* 4). The purpose of all his teachings in social philosophy is to lead society, and through society, the individual, to God (*Gillet—Le Moral et La Social*), while he points out at all times that the study of society ought to lead to divine and gospel standards.

The learned Doctor maintains that society is built upon morality and intelligence, that the will must be inclined to virtuous habits by a proper schooling in the distinction between good and evil and that the intellect can be assisted in attaining perfection of operation by working with more mature minds. When we strip man of his soul and restrict him from intellectual activity as the Materialists have done we take away his rationality, leaving nothing but a brute animal. Schwalm says (*Lecons de Philosophie Sociale,* Vol. 1, p. 13), "L'homme originellement isole, de Rousseau, est malheureaux parce qu'il manque de secours necessarires: comment arriver tout seul, a se nourrir, se vetir, se loger, se soigner, se defendre? Malheureux aussi parce qu'il manque de communications. Il n'est pas libre non plus; parce qu'il n'est pas en etat d'exercer son libre arbitre. Sa raison, privee des enseignements et des corrections de l'education, ne sait pas reconnaitre les biens qui devraient fixer

son choix. Il tatonne et vit en animal." In quoting the teachings of St. Thomas (*Lecons de Philosophie Sociale,* Vol. 1, p. 10), he says that man is guided by intellectual and moral principles. "Chez l'homme, le besoin de communication est spirituel, car il ajoute à la mimique et aux interjections ou onomatopées des passions, l'expression des idées abstraites et des principes moraux. De ces signes, comme des raisons psychologiques, il appert que la sociabilite purement materielle et sensible chez l'animal, est, chez l'homme, intelligente et morale."

This is the modern trend of Catholic literature. Sociological study demands first consideration from Catholics who are well grounded in the principles of their faith and are thoroughly conversant with modern tendencies. Recognizing the value of sociological research they emphasize and show the importance of Christian morality and intelligence in conjunction with the study of social groups, their writings and activities having been in evidence more than a decade ago (*Naudet—Premiers Principes de Sociologie Catholique*). The followers of St. Thomas have long been interested in this question, a problem which present-day scientists hail as a pioneer study. Special references can be found in Hugueney's "L'Etat et L'individu," p. 341, and in Gillet's "Le Moral et le Social," p. 311, both appearing in Melanges Thomistes. A most valuable reference for those who search in another sphere for proof of what has been said in this treatise can be had in Gillet's "Conscience Chretienne et Justice Sociale," a summary of all of the author's various works. He knew that the Angelic Doctor offered the correct answer to the problem and so the latter work was prepared as a proof of this viewpoint.

CHAPTER V

Habits Virtues Faculties

The general connection of moral with intellectual virtues has been indicated. This chapter might be called the definite Thomistic confirmation of what has been said. It might have been better to give the general idea of virtue first. But the need of showing the importance and difficulties of the question under discussion justifies a more particular observation of what has been sketched along general lines, viz., the nature of habit, virtue and vice. A complete analysis of the psychological relations of moral habits with intelligence is impossible in this work. However, in view of modern attitudes toward instincts and habits and having in mind the present controversy concerning instincts which has instigated many debates both pro and con, St. Thomas ought to be permitted to contribute his principles more definitely. To eliminate lengthy quotations the following summary of St. Thomas' attitude is made without explicit comparison with recent efforts around the same problem but with definite ideas of the modern solutions that challenge Thomistic principles on the relation of habit with virtue, the psychological relations of habit and action, and fundamentally the entire Thomistic and scholastic principles of potentiality and actuality.

St. Thomas defines virtue as a "good habit of the mind by which we live righteously, of which no one can make bad use, which God forms in us, without us" (1-2*ae*, *Q.* 55, *a.* 4). From the essence of virtue comes a perfection of power. This power belongs to the soul, and so we say that virtue belongs to the soul from which all its operations proceed by means of a power disposed toward the best end, which is the identical aim of virtue (*Ibid*).

"Habit," according to the Angelic Doctor, "is the disposition of a subject which is in a state of potentiality either to form or to operation." Habitus (habit) is derived from habendo (having). This derivation can be taken in two ways, when a subject is said to have something, or when a subject has a relation (se habet) either to itself or to something else. Whether habit be of the soul or of the body, it is disposed according to its nature which makes it the first species of quality (1-2*ae, Q.* 49, *a.* 1).

Let us consider habit as pertaining to the soul. We can say definitely that habit belongs principally in the soul because every bodily action is the result of some natural quality of the body or the outcome of the soul moving the body. Moreover, habit does not have its subject in the body since habit implies disposition to bodily action and we already know that every operation of the body proceeds from a natural quality of the body or from the soul moving the body. We often speak of bodily habits, but these are only habitual dispositions, such as health or beauty. We cannot call them habits for they do not represent the perfect nature of habit. This is due principally to the changeableness of their causes, but also to their being resident only in the body (1-2*ae, Q.* 50, *a.* 1).

The sensitive powers have an innate instinct to obey the command of reason and to be disposed to various things. This reveals the fact that habit is resident in them also (1-2*ae, Q.* 50, *a.* 3).

We sometimes hear habit of the intellect discussed. It is necessary that habit reside in the intellect for the principle to act is in the intellect and the act of understanding belongs to the power of the intellect. We find from this that understanding is an operation of the intellect and a habit of the intellect (1-2*ae, Q.* 50, *a.* 4).

From the very nature of habit we can conclude that it is in the will. One does not form a habit unless one

wills to do it. This is evident proof that the will is a seat of habit and is prompted to act by it (1-2*ae*, *Q.* 50, *a.* 5).

Now that the different sources of habit have been discovered the question concerning the formation of habits naturally arises. Some habits owe their existence partly to nature and partly to some extrinsic agency. Knowledge is a natural habit and one person who has keener sense organs than another can understand a thing better. This is a habit of the apprehensive powers.

If the principle of the mover moved is considered we find human acts to be the cause of habits. A person is moved and disposed to execute some action. The person moved by the action of the agent is the passive power. If he is moved repeatedly a certain quality is formed in him which is a habit (1-2*ae*, *Q.* 51, *a.* 1).

A habit of science can be formed by one single operation of the reason if the intellect can be convinced by a self-evident proposition and can reach a firm conclusion.

In contrast to this, many acts of the reason are required to form a habit when considering probable propositions (1-2*ae*, *Q.* 51, *a.* 3).

The same is true of the habits of the appetitive and apprehensive powers, the appetitive powers not directing their attention to the same thing continuously but being inclined to many things, and the apprehensive powers need constant repetition of acts to be firmly impressed by them (1-2*ae*, *Q.* 51, *a.* 3).

Habits are also divinely infused in us by God. Our human nature could never possess the power to form habits in us disposing ourselves to our ultimate end, namely, perfect happiness, and so God gives us His divine power that we may attain our end and at the same time recognize His power (1-2*ae*, *Q.* 51, *a.* 4).

Corruption of habits next claims our attention. All habits, good or bad, are susceptible to corruption or dis-

integration if the motion of a judgment of reason is contrary to good or to bad and influenced by ignorance, passion or deliberate choice.

Habits can be destroyed providing there is a long interval between the performance of acts. If a habit is corrupted by an opposing agency it needs to be strengthened by acts proceeding from it, and if these acts are done after long cessation or omitted altogether the habit will be either destroyed or greatly diminished (1-2*ae*, *Q.* 53, *a.* 3).

There is a difference in habits according to their relation to nature. They are either agreeable or disagreeable to nature for acts of virtue are disposed to one's nature and reason, and acts of vice are opposed to them. Consequently, as habits are good or bad, therein do they differ (1-2*ae*, *Q.* 54, *a.* 3).

Habits determine active natural powers, proper to man, indifferently to acts. These powers are virtues in themselves. Thus virtue is an operative habit, for it has relation to act and belongs to the soul, which is the principle and form of action. The power of virtue in anything is limited to the good. This, therefore, makes virtue a good habit (1-2*ae*, *Q.* 55, *a.* 2).

The residence or subject of the different habits forms an interesting phase of St. Thomas' analysis. Virtue is found in various faculties. The intellect is the subject of virtue in that it is subordinate to the will and is moved by the will, for a man considers nothing actually unless he wills to do so (1-2*ae*, *Q.* 56, *a.* 3).

The irascible and concupiscible powers are the subject of virtue for we find some virtues residing in these powers. An act proceeding from one power and moved by another cannot be perfect if both powers are not well disposed to the act. Operations of the irascible and concupiscible powers, as they are moved by reason, must have some habit perfecting them so that they may act well, not only in the reason, but also in the powers.

Human virtue, participating thus in the reason, can have these powers as its subject (1-2*ae*, *Q*. 50, *a*. 4).

Virtues are placed in two great divisions, intellectual and moral. There are only two principles of human actions in man, the intellect or reason, and the appetite, meaning the intellectual appetite or will. Every human virtue must, therefore, be a perfection of one of these. For example, if a good deed perfects a man's speculative or practical intellect it is an intellectual virtue, and if it perfects his appetitive faculty it is a moral virtue (1-2*ae*, *Q*. 58, *a*. 3).

There are five intellectual virtues: wisdom, understanding, science, art and prudence.

Understanding is one of the intellectual virtues which perfects the speculative intellect for the consideration of truth. A truth known in itself is immediately understood by the intellect. This habit, perfecting the intellect for a knowledge of truth, is understanding (1-2*ae*, *Q*. 57, *a*. 1).

The intellectual virtue of wisdom is perfect and universal judgment based on the first causes; it judges all things rightly and sets them in order by means of the investigation of reason (1-2*ae*, *Q*. 57, *a*. 1).

We call science an intellectual virtue since it perfects the intellect about conclusions of the different kinds of knowable matter (1-2*ae*, *Q*. 57, *a*. 2).

Another intellectual virtue is art—the right reason about things to be done. It is the aptness to work well and does not affect the appetitive faculty, but only the quality of the work to be done (1-2*ae*, *Q*. 57, *a*. 3).

Counsel and choice are acts of the reason necessary to direct man to his proper end. These acts are included in the intellectual virtue of prudence. This virtue both perfects and resides in the reason. It directs man to his proper end and also perfects the appetitive faculty whose object is both the good and the end (1-2*ae*, *Q*. 57, *a*. 4).

This completes our definitions and enumeration of the intellectual virtues. The second important division of virtues is moral. The word, moral, is taken from the Latin word, mos, meaning custom, an action that becomes second nature to man, the same as a natural one. From this we learn that these actions belong to the appetitive faculty which moves all powers to their acts (1-2*ae*, *Q*. 58, *a*. 1).

The actions dispose the appetitive faculty to perform good deeds. These are associated with the moral virtues, also known as cardinal virtues, which are Prudence, Justice, Temperance and Fortitude (1-2*ae*, *Q*. 61, *a*. 1).

Reason defines good as the formal principle of virtue. It is considered in two ways, as one particular virtue existing in the very act of the reason, known as Prudence, and when the reason puts its order into operation, giving us the virtue of Justice.

Two virtues are required when the reason puts its order into passions and is overcome by them. If the passions are incited to something contrary to reason a restraint must be placed upon them. This restraint is the virtue of Temperance.

If the passions prevent man through fear from following the dictates of reason, a virtue to strengthen him against the attacks of the passions is necessary. We call this virtue Fortitude.

These moral virtues are all related to some faculty. Prudence perfects the power which is rational in its essence, the will is subject to Justice, the concupiscible faculty to Temperance, and the irascible faculty to Fortitude (1-2*ae*, *Q*. 61, *a*. 2).

These moral and intellectual virtues are basic in St. Thomas's treatment of intellectuality and morality. But it must be understood that both the theological or infused virtues along with the cardinal moral virtues form merely the skeleton of a hierarchy of moral qualities that reaches into every phase of personal and social life. For this

reason the following table of all the virtues treated by St. Thomas will be valuable, both as a synopsis and as a basis for further study.

Moral Virtues

PRUDENCE*	JUSTICE*	TEMPERANCE*	FORTITUDE*
Memory	Religion	Shamefacedness	Trust
Docility	Sanctity	Honesty	Magnificence
Shrewdness	Devotion	Abstinence	Patience
Reason	Prayer	Sobriety	Perseverance
Providence	Adoration	Chastity	Magnanimity
Circumspection	Sacrifice	Modesty	Constancy
Caution	Oblation	Continence	Philotimy
Government	Tithes	Humility	Mildness
Politics	Vows	Clemency	
Economy	Oath	Wise Direction	
Military	Swearing	Ornatus	
Eubilia	Praise of God	Parsimony	
(Good Counsel)	Piety	Moderation	
Synesis	Observance	Simplicity	
(Intelligence)	Dulia	Studiousness	
Gnome	Obedience	Eutrapalia	
(Judgment)	Gratitude	(Liveliness and Politeness)	
	Vindication		
	Truth		
	Affability		
	Liberality		
	Epicheia		
	Do Good		
	Avoid Evil		
	Commutative		
	Distributive		

*Natural Cardinal Virtue

CHARITY*	FAITH*	HOPE*
Love	Confession	
Joy	Piety	
Peace	Fear of God	
Mercy	Purified Heart	
Beneficence		
Almsgiving		
Fraternal Correction		

Intellectual Virtues

NATURAL	SUPERNATURAL
Wisdom	Faith
Knowledge	
Understanding	
Art	
Prudence	
Eubulia	
Synesis	
Gnome	

*Supernatural Virtue.

All of these virtues are given an exhaustive study in the writings of St. Thomas. He presents a detailed interpretation and conducts a minute investigation around each virtue with its contrary vices. A complete discussion of the individual virtues with their subsidiary good habits and opposing vices cannot be attempted within the limits of this treatise. We merely seek to show twentieth century social workers as well as other modern scientists the daylight at the end of the tunnel of misconception and false teachings. The precision and conciseness of St. Thomas's teachings on the virtues must necessarily impress the reader of the profound knowledge so characteristic of the holy Dominican, qualified as he was, not only by his superior mental powers, but also by his saintly life, to explain the different virtues in a most clear and comprehensive manner.

CHAPTER VI

Basic Relationships: Psychological: Prudence

I

The Psychological Basis of Relationship

In his treatise on virtues (1-2*ae*, *Q.* 22), St. Thomas discusses the habits that are resident in the different faculties of the soul, namely, the appetitive and the intellectual faculties, and he states in regard to each habit the definite power of the soul it assists. Thus, in the appetitive faculties are the virtues of Prudence, Justice, Temperance and Fortitude, called moral or cardinal virtues. The intellectual virtues reside in the intellectual faculties. These good habits are wisdom, science, art, understanding and prudence. He ascribes a connection of the moral virtues with one another (1-2*ae*, *Q.* 65, *a.* 1), and quotes St. Gregory as saying that "there can be no true prudence without temperance, justice and fortitude," with the same assertion applying to the other virtues. St. Thomas then proves the statement by pointing out that the other moral virtues cannot exist without prudence because right choice always accompanies and is proper to moral virtue, and also that prudence requires the other moral virtues since the main object of the reason toward an act is the end of that act, to which end man is rightly directed by moral virtue. On the other hand, he shows us that the intellectual virtues have no connection with one another (1-2*ae*, *Q.* 65, *a.* 1), for we may easily see that the virtue of science is totally independent from the virtue of art and can be practiced separately from it.

It is strange that in the treatise on virtues and their connection and non-connection with one another, we find no definite article with a treatment on the relation

between the moral and the intellectual virtues by St. Thomas. He explains fully the connection between the moral virtues and points out the non-connection between the intellectual virtues, but no where shows a definite relation between these respective virtues. Why he omitted a discussion on this evident condition we cannot say, but we shall prove that a real psychological affiliation does exist between the intellectual and moral virtues.

For the sake of clarity we present this table of analysis showing the roots of all human actions:

CLASSIFICATION OF SOURCES OF ACTION*

Class or Genus.		Particular Powers.	Tendencies.
Vegetative		Nutritive (1a, Q. 78, a. 2) Augmentative (ibid. ad. 3; ad. 4) Generative (ibid. ad. 2; ad. 4)	
Sensitive	External (1a, Q. 78, a. 3)	Sight (1a, Q. 78, a. 3) Hearing (ibid.) Smell (ibid. Taste (ibid.) Touch (ibid.)	
	Internal (1a, Q. 78, a. 4)	Common Sense (1a, Q. 78, a. 4) Memory (ibid.) Imagination (ibid.) Estimation (ibid.)	
Appetitive	Sensitive (1a, Q. 80, a. 1, a. 2)	Irascible (Q. 81, a. 2, a. 3) (1-2ae, QQ. 22, 23, 24, 25)	Hope (1-2ae, Q. 40) Despair Courage (ibid. Q. 45) Fear (ibid. QQ. 41, 42, 43, 44) Anger (ibid. QQ. 46, 47, 48)
		Concupiscible (Q. 81, a. 2, a. 3)	Love (1-2ae, QQ. 26, 27, 28) Desire (ibid. Q. 45) Pleasure (ibid. QQ. 31, 32, 33, 34) Hatred (ibid. Q. 29) Aversion Sadness (ibid. QQ. 35, 36, 37, 38, 39)
	Rational (Q. 80, a. 2; QQ. 82, 83)	Will	
Intellective		Intellect	Active Intellect (Q. 79 a. 3, a. 4) Possible Intellect (ibid) Practical Intellect (aa. 10, 11) Speculative Intellect (aa. 10, 11) Universal Intellect (ibid.)
Locomotive		Locomotion	

*H. I. Smith, O. P.–Classification of Desires in St. Thomas and in Modern Sociology: p. 19

It is evident that this division of the sources of action presupposes the faculty theory of the soul. Modern psychology generally repudiates this theory. In fact this subject of scholastic and Thomistic psychology and anthropology is a universal source of ridicule by moderns. Our discussion is only incidental to the problem —the opening up of avenues of help in St. Thomas to a more detailed study of intelligence and morality in the future. The fact is, however, that the faculty theory of the soul places within the human composite only one source of action, a simple, spiritual and incorruptible substance that vivifies and animates the composite (1*a*, *Q.* 75, *aa.* 1-7). No finite substance can be immediately operative and must act through its potencies or powers. Consequently, the soul must possess powers or faculties. The metaphysical principles in which these deductions are made are basic in St. Thomas. They involve the fundamental laws of actuality and potentiality, substance and accidens, and the philosophical explanation of the difference between the finite and the infinite. The faculty theory of the soul is, therefore, inseparable from the cosmic system of St. Thomas and insists on, first, the reality of the soul substance, secondly, the reality of the faculty as distinct but not separate from the soul, and thirdly, the reality of the distinction between each faculty. The differentiation and classification of the faculties are based by St. Thomas on observation and experiment and on the diversity of function. While modern psychology outside the school either completely ignores both the existence and the classification of the faculties or makes them mere mental facts without objective, in reality, the theory is not without prominent defenders, among whom may be found Cardinal Mercier (*Manual of Scholastic Philosophy; Vol.* 1, *p.* 498).

The point to be emphasized here is that the faculty theory is deeply rooted in St. Thomas and is officially listed as such in the twenty-four Propositions of the

Sacred Congregation of Studies (*Pegue*, 24 *Theses*). Furthermore, its service in sociological investigation has already been shown (*Smith—Classification of Desires in St. Thomas and in Modern Sociology*), and it is undeniable in pointing out the psychological foundation for the connection of morality with the intellect.

These faculties, or powers of the soul, are most intimately united in Thomistic Philosophy. On this basis alone could be established a close relationship between moral qualities and thinking, for if intelligence and conation are so closely related, the habits which arise from their activity must likewise be united and there is a constant interplay of functions.

The intellectual faculties, reason and will, exercise a control even over the vegetile. They direct the many movements and processes through which the body functions. In the vegetile faculties, habits of health, developing permanent qualities which take care of nutrition, growth and generation can be formed when they bear directly on the concupiscible powers.

Cognitive powers can also be the recipients of habits. They react invariably to environment. The imagination can be controlled if developed in the proper surroundings but if it is not restrained it can exceed all reasonable limits. This influence of the imagination incidentally accounts for many seeming paradoxes in the relations between knowledge, actions, virtues and vices. For instance, in the view of St. Thomas, morality exerts a distinct influence on intelligence since it can arouse the intellect to exercise its greatest capabilities. On the other hand, immorality at times can effect the same result. A musician may play better when he is under the influence of liquor than when he is sober. An actor may be deprived of his mental powers by the action of the alcohol upon his mind. Moral depravity, therefore, can stimulate the intellectual faculties or it can hinder them in the performance of their duties.

The will often commands the actions of the intellect and moves it at its pleasure. We know that this is true because frequently we do not think about a subject unless we will to do it. My will is prompting me to think of the plan of this dissertation and I am following its inclination.

II

Prudence as a Basis of Relationship

Aside from the general psychological relation between the moral virtues and their intellectual correlatives a more definite connection is found in the virtue of prudence. Prudence is not only one of the intellectual virtues, but also one of the most important of moral habits. While they are distinct virtues in the sense that one is speculative and the other practical, they are so closely related that no barrier of isolation can be found in Thomistic ethics between moral qualities and intelligence. We term prudence as an intellectual function. However, it is applied in practical ways. One who has been well drilled in the virtue of prudence theoretically must learn to put his knowledge to practical use in the work of life.

It is very obvious then, that moral virtue must be accompanied by prudence, since it directs us in choosing the proper end and prompts the appetitive faculty to select a good according to reason. But prudence must have understanding in the practice of moral virtues for we must arrive at self-evident principles both in speculative and practical matters. This cannot be done in the practice of charity, for instance, if we do not comprehend that our act both strengthens our own character and provides for another's comfort.

St. Thomas comes closest to definitely indicating the connection between moral qualities and intelligence when

he answers the question (1-2*ae*, *Q.* 58, *a.* 4), "Can Moral Virtue Exist Without Intellectual Virtue?"

"Moral virtue can be without some of the intellectual virtues, viz., wisdom, science and art; but not without understanding and prudence. Moral virtue cannot be without prudence because it is a habit of choosing, i. e., making us choose well. Now, in order that a choice be good, two things are required. First, that the intention be directed to a due end; and this is done by moral virtue, which inclines the appetitive faculty to good according to reason which is a due end. Secondly, that a man take rightly those things that have reference to the end; and this he cannot do unless his reason counsel, judge and command aright, which is the function of prudence and the virtues annexed to it as stated above (1-2*ae*, *Q.* 57, *aa.* 5, 6). Wherefore, there can be no moral virtue without prudence; and consequently, neither can there be without understanding. For it is by the virtue of understanding that we know self-evident principles both in speculative and practical matters. Consequently, just as right reason in speculative matters, in so far as it proceeds from naturally known principles, presupposes the understanding of those principles, so also does prudence, which is the right reason about things to be done."

Again (1-2*ae*, *Q.* 58, *a.* 5), he answers the question, "Can Intellectual Virtue Exist Without Moral Virtue?"

"Other intellectual virtues can, but prudence cannot be without moral virtue. The reason for this is that prudence is the right reason about things to be done (and this not merely in general, but also in particular); about which things actions are. Now, right reason demands principles from which reason proceeds to argue. And when reason argues about particular cases, it needs not only universal but also particular principles. As to universal principles of action, man is rightly disposed by the natural understanding of principles,

whereby he understands that he should do no evil; or again by some practical science. But this is not enough in order that man may reason aright about particular cases. For it happens sometimes that the aforesaid universal principal, known by means of understanding or science, is destroyed in a particular case by reason of a passion; thus to one who is swayed by concupiscence, when he is overcome thereby, the object of his desire seems good, although it is opposed to the universal judgment of his reason. Consequently, as by the habit of natural understanding or of science, man is made to be rightly disposed with regard to the particular principles of action, viz., the ends, he needs to be perfected by certain habits, whereby it becomes connatural, as it were, to man to judge aright of the end of virtue, because such as a man is, such does the end seem to him (*Ethic.* 111). Consequently, the right reason about things to be done, viz., prudence, requires man to have moral virtue.

"Prudence not only helps us to be of good counsel, but also to judge and command well. This is not possible unless the impediment of the passions, destroying the judgment and command of prudence, be removed; and this is done by moral virtue."

The doctrine of St. Thomas contained in this section may be summed up in the following manner.

I. Psychological Connection of Intelligence with Moral Virtue:

(a) The power of the soul issues into action through its faculties.

(b) These faculties present a hierarchy of interrelations and inter-dependencies with the closest kind of union between knowledge and conation.

(c) Habit is nothing more than the sum total of the operations or activities of these faculties. As a

consequence, these habits must be as intimately connected as the sources or faculties in which they arise.

(d) Moral virtues, therefore, in the psychological teaching of St. Thomas, must be related to intelligence.

II. Intelligence and Moral Virtues Connected by Prudence which is both Intellectual and Moral.

CHAPTER VII

Prudence

It is evident that Prudence, in the general plan of St. Thomas, is the connecting bond between moral and intellectual qualities. A more detailed explanation of prudence, in its bearings on the relation of moral qualities and intelligence, will develop the constantly repeated principle of St. Thomas, "Moral virtues may be found without intellectual virtues except prudence and ideas; and intellectual virtues may be found without all virtues except prudence" (1-2*ae*, *Q.* 58, *a.* 4). Prudence therefore unites them all.

Prudence has essentially the nature of a virtue, not only in the same way as the other intellectual virtues which rectify the consideration of reason by a material good regardless of the aptness of the appetite, but also as the moral virtues which direct good formally as well as materially, and consider the rectitude of the appetite under the aspect of good (2-2*ae*, *Q.* 47, *a.* 4).

It is also a virtue distinct from all others. It differs from the other intellectual virtues by a material difference of objects. Wisdom, knowledge and understanding are related to necessary things, but art and prudence to contingent things. Art concerns itself with external production, such as a house, or a knife, and prudence with behavior, or in relation to the agent himself. It differs from the other moral virtues, since it is resident in the intellective power while the others are in the appetitive (2-2*ae*, *Q.* 47, *a.* 2).

St. Thomas states that prudence is in the reason, for to be prudent one must have a keen sight and be able to foresee the event of uncertainties (2-2*ae*, *Q.* 47, *a.* 1). Sight is in the cognitive faculty. In order to

obtain a knowledge of the future from a knowledge of the present or past we must evolve a process of comparison which is taken from the practical reason where the prudent man gets his capabilities to take good counsel, and this is concerned with things in relation to some end dealt with by the practical reason.

The mean of reason in man's deeds is the chief work of prudence. This mean is found by disposing rightly the things that are directed to the end (2-2*ae*, *Q*. 47, *a*. 7).

The principal act of prudence is command. In it, things that are counseled and judged are applied to action. This is closely related to the end of practical reason and, hence, is the chief act of prudence (2-2*ae*, *Q*. 47, *a*. 8).

Another part of prudence is solicitude. This implies shrewdness and alertness of mind about something to be done. Aristotle admonishes us to "be quick in carrying out the counsel taken but slow in taking counsel" (2-2*ae*, *Q*. 47, *a*. 9).

Common good is also the concern of prudence as well as the good of the individual (2-2*ae*, *Q*. 47, *a*. 10). To seek only individual good is contrary to right reason. Prudence always counsels, judges and commands in relation to the proper end which, in this instance, is the preference of the common good over that of the individual.

St. Thomas names three kinds of prudence (2-2*ae*, *Q*. 47, *a*. 13). The first is false prudence, by which a man disposes well of things that are fitting for an evil end. The end is good only in appearance, not in truth, as we often speak of a prudent robber who has worked out fitting ways for committing robbery.

Prudence is imperfect when it has for its end a good which is not the common end of all human life, but only of one phase of it. For example, when a man has developed a perfect way of conducting business he

is considered a good business man, but he has formed good judgment in only one phase of life, not about life in general. Therefore, his prudence is imperfect.

True and perfect prudence takes counsel, judges and commands rightly in respect to the good end of life as a whole. It can not exist in sinners, while false prudence is common only to sinners and imperfect prudence can exist in both the good and the bad.

All virtues are connected. Thus, we find prudence in a man who is in the state of grace, for St. Thomas affirms that if a man possesses one virtue he possesses them all. If he has charity he also has the other virtues, prudence included (2-2*ae*, *Q*. 47, *a*. 14).

There are three parts in a virtue, namely, integral, subjective and potential. Those things which are necessary for the perfect act of a virtue are the integral parts of a virtue. Prudence has eight integral parts, viz: memory, reasoning, understanding, docility, shrewdness, foresight, circumspection and caution. The first five are the property of prudence as a cognitive virtue, and the last three belong to it as commanding and applying knowledge to action. The reason must have three conditions to command right; first, to direct toward a right end, second, to control the circumstances of the matter, and third, to avoid obstacles. These conditions are applicable to foresight, circumspection and caution respectively (2-2*ae*, *Q*. 48, *a*. 1).

The subjective parts of prudence are, that by which a man governs himself, that by which he governs a multitude. The individual good and the common good have different ends which require a different species of prudence according to the respective ends.

The potential parts of prudence are, good counsel, about which is counsel; synthesis, about which is judgment in things of general occurrence; gnome, about which is judgment in things of exception to the law. These parts are really virtues in themselves, but they

are connected with prudence and are related to secondary acts which do not have the full power of prudence (2-2*ae*, *Q*. 48, *a*. 1).

It would be well to consider the integral parts of prudence in particular. Memory is a part of prudence. It records many experiences for us. Aristotle says that "intellectual virtue is engendered and fostered by experience and time" (2-2*ae*, *Q*. 49, *a*. 1).

Understanding is an integral part of prudence also. It is the correct estimate of some final self-evident principle. We secure every deduction of reason from certain primary statements. Thus every process of reasoning proceeds from some understanding (2-2*ae*, *Q*. 49, *a*. 2).

A ready acceptance of teaching is a mark of docility. This is another integral part of prudence, for prudence concerns itself with an infinite variety of particular matters requiring a long time to consider. In matters of this kind, we need the teachings of our elders, who, by their experience, possess a sensible knowledge of all practical matters (2-2*ae*, *Q*. 49, *a*. 3).

Shrewdness is numbered among the parts of prudence. St. Thomas defines it as "an apt disposition to acquire a right opinion by one's self" (2-2*ae*, *Q*. 49, *a*. 4). A right opinion in which prudence is found can be obtained in two ways; from another, according to docility, and by one's self, or through shrewdness.

Reason is included in prudence. If a man is prudent he is also a good reasoner. Reason is an investigation from certain things to others. This is also the work of counsel, and this, in turn, is the work of prudence.

Foresight relates to something distant, directing occurrences in the present to it. Prudence considers future contingents in respect to the end of life. Prudence is then concerned with foresight since future contingents may be applied in the word, foresight (2-2*ae*, *Q*. 49, *a*. 6).

Circumspection is essential in prudence. Although prudence is about singular matters of action, being good in themselves and having a good end, nevertheless, by a combination of circumstances they can become evil and have an evil end for, to use the example given by St. Thomas (2-2*ae*, *Q*. 49, *a*. 7), one might think that by displaying love for another will bring love in return; but this manifestation of love may give rise to flattery or to suspicion of flattery or to pride, which would cease to be a means to a good end. Circumspection is, therefore, essentially necessary in prudence.

Caution is required in prudence to assist us in avoiding confusion between good and evil which can often be united in the great variety of contingent matters of action (2-2*ae*, *Q*. 49, *a*. 8).

Every virtue has its opposite vices. Not only has it those vices which are openly opposed to it but also those which might be mistaken for it, their relationship not being true, however, but spurious, as, for instance, craftiness and its close similarity to prudence. We shall now discuss those vices opposed to prudence.

Imprudence, as a privation, is a sin. It displays a lack of that prudence which is possible for every man to have but does not possess on account of negligence in his effort to acquire it.

Imprudence, when considered as a contrary, or when an act of the reason is opposed to prudence, as when an imprudent man refuses counsel, is a sin. A man cannot disregard the rules on which the right reason of prudence depends. If a man rejects the Divine teaching through contempt the sin becomes mortal. It is a venial sin if he does not have contempt for things necessary for salvation (2-2*ae*, *Q*. 53, *a*. 1).

There are many different kinds of imprudence since it opposes the various subjective parts of prudence which govern the individual and the multitude. Precipitation and temerity, by defect of counsel, are species of

imprudence; thoughtlessness, by defect of judgment, and inconstancy and negligence by opposing command. Incautiousness and incircumspection may be included with thoughtlessness; lack of docility, of memory, and of reason with precipitation; improvidence, lack of intelligence and of shrewdness with negligence and inconstancy (2-2*ae*, *Q*. 53, *a*. 2).

Precipitation is a vice of imprudence. One who does not take counsel by orderly steps of memory of the past, intelligence of the present, shrewdness in considering future results, reasoning in comparing different acts, and docility in accepting the teaching of others, rushes into action by the impulse of his will or a passion and becomes guilty of precipitation (2-2*ae*, *Q*. 53, *a*. 3).

Thought is related to the judgment and judgment to the intellect. When one does not judge, either because he is unmindful of those things which pertain to right judgment, or out of contempt, he is guilty of the sin of thoughtlessness, which is related to imprudence.

Inconstancy is the result of a defect in the act of command. We attribute this vice to the reason, for the reason fails in commanding a person to retain what he has accepted when he casts it aside for something else inordinately pleasing to him (2-2*ae*, *Q*. 53, *a*. 5).

These vices which we have treated arise chiefly from lust or sexual pleasure, which absorbs the mind and corrupts the true concept of prudence (2-2*ae*, *Q*. 53, *a*. 6).

Negligence opposes prudence. Where solicitude is wanting we blame negligence, for Isidore says "a negliment man is one who fails to choose" (2-2*ae*, *Q*. 54, *a*. 2). If an act that is omitted is necessary to salvation, and if the will separates itself without concern from the charity of God, negligence becomes a mortal sin.

The vice of prudence of the flesh (*carnal cunning*) resembles the virtue of prudence. It places carnal goods as the ultimate end of life. This is corrupted prudence,

for our ultimate end does not tend toward bodily goods. This prudence of the flesh becomes a mortal sin when one subordinates the final end of life to the will of the flesh, thereby rejecting God (2-2*ae*, *Q*. 55, *a*. 1).

Craftiness and guile are also contrary vices of the virtue of prudence. Craftiness is a fictitious and counterfeit means to attain to either a certain good or evil end (2-2*ae*, *Q*. 55, *a*. 3).

Guile is a means employed in pursuing fictitious and apparently true ways to their execution (2-2*ae*, *Q*. 55, *a*. 4).

We have mentioned that these vices bear a certain similarity to prudence in a number of uses of the reason. The correct use of the reason of all the moral virtues is found in justice, for justice is resident in the rational appetite. If reason is used incorrectly it is in the opposite vices of justice of which the principal one is covetousness. We may conclude, then, that all the foregoing vices arise from covetousness (2-2*ae*, *Q*. 55, *a*. 8).

Prudence is far reaching and in one form or another is constantly inter-acting on morality and intelligence. It will be seen that Temperance, because of the way that St. Thomas carries it down to the rock bottom of all individual and social activity, is equally suggestive as a means of analyzing the relation between morality and the intellect.

CHAPTER VIII

Temperance

Temperance demands special attention on account of the extent which St. Thomas has given it in his works and the importance he accords it among the other virtues. In the Summa Theologica alone he employs thirty questions to define the virtue and its parts and explain to us how they should be practiced rightly, at the same time teaching us the way to avoid its vices. The same is true in his other writings where Temperance is discussed, every treatise being reasoned out in most minute detail. The noted disciple of St. Dominic pays particular attention to this virtue because of the vitally momentous part it plays in the life of everyone. It is concerned with the pleasures of food and sex, with the conservation of the individual and the race.

Temperance is a subject on which St. Thomas ought to be especially objective since he was a part of an age that was known for its extremes in modes of living. Orgies in which the participants reveled in riotous excesses of food, drink and sexual pleasures were ordinary occurrences of thirteenth century university life. This was off-set to some extent by the religious orders whose members practiced self-denial and physical as well as intellectual control. In the conflict between luxury and asceticism the "Angel of the Schools" was well adapted by position to present his viewpoint.

We offer first his general ideas of the relation of immorality to intelligence and follow these with some particular and pointed observations he made "passive."

Temperance is a virtue and a special virtue, because it "bridles" our inclinations to things that are most alluring, "maxime allicientibus" (2-2*ae*, *Q.* 141, *a.* 1).

It is a cardinal virtue for around it all practical life hinges (1-2*ae*, *Q.* 66, *a.* 4).

There is no guarantee for a man that he will be relieved of all temptations by practicing temperance, but his condition will be improved by his attempt to overcome intemperate habits (*De Verit. Q.* 25, *a.* 7). This accounts for the supremacy of temperance over other virtues—the conquering of pleasures that arise more than warring against their attack (2-2*ae*, *Q.* 138, *a.* 2, *ad.* 4).

As we have already stated, the principal consideration of temperance deals with excesses of food and drink —the primitive urges of every individual. St. Thomas's concept of human happiness is based fundamentally on this virtue. This is evident in "De Beatitudine," The Way to Happiness, one of his greatest treatises in the Summa (1-2*ae*). He found his highest happiness in the religious life and wrote what is often described as his mightiest work, "*Contra Impugnantes Religionem Dei*," in defense of it. Here temperance as a virtue is most completely represented, since it shows us the consequences of entire renunciation of food and sex.

Although temperance is measured more by its reference to spiritual happiness than by its contribution to physical happiness its inflexible standards must make concessions to the needs of life (2-2*ae*, *Q.* 141, *a.* 6, *ad.* 3) (1-2*ae*, *Q.* 63, *a.* 4). "There is a two-fold specific difference among habits. The first, as stated above (*Q. LIV*, *A.* 2; *Q. LVI*, *A.* 2; *Q. LX*, *A.* 1), is taken from the specific and formal aspects of their objects. Now the object of every virtue is a good considered as in that virtue's proper matter: thus the object of temperance is a good in respect of the pleasures connected with the concupiscence of touch. The formal aspect of this object is from reason which fixes the mean in these concupiscences. Now, it is evident that the mean that is appointed in such like concupiscences according to the rule of human reason, is seen under a different aspect

from the mean which is fixed according to the Divine rule. For instance, in the consumption of food, the mean fixed by human reason, is that food should not harm the health of the body, nor hinder the use of reason: whereas, according to the Divine rule, it behooves man to chastise his body, and bring it into subjection (1 *Cor. ix.* 27), by abstinence in the matter of food and drink and the like. It is therefore evident that infused and acquired temperance differ in species'' (1-2*ae*, *Q.* 63, *a.* 4).

St. Thomas does not limit the virtue of temperance to alcoholic liquor. We wish to stress this fact for the benefit of those who think of temperance with only intoxicating drink in mind so that they may not miss the full content of his purpose. The (''modus'') objective of the virtue and all its parts is the restriction of all organic pleasure (2-2*ae*, *Q.* 141, *a.* 2). We repeat here a list of the subsidiary virtues of temperance:

TEMPERANCE

Shamefacedness	Continence	Moderation
Honesty	Humility	Simplicity
Abstinence	Clemency	Studiousness
Sobriety	Wise Direction	Eutrapalia
Chastity	Ornatus	(Liveliness and
Modesty	Parsimony	Politeness)

St Thomas says that all of these virtues in one way or another control excesses of organic pleasure. The object of temperance is not to suppress pleasure but to regulate all pleasures of touch, in the sense that he understood touch—as the foundation of all other senses (eye, ear, smell, taste and the interior senses)—toward reason and divine law (1-2*ae*, *Q.* 63, *a.* 4). This explains his reason for saying that temperance rightly understood designs essentially to limit pleasures and at the same time to show how these pleasures can be used according to the dictates of reason (4, *d.* 33, *Q.* 3, *a.* 2, *ad.* 5). This is the most human and unbigoted statement St. Thomas ever made. The real rule for conscientious pleasure is derived from divine law and sensual enjoyments are

lawful unless they break a divine command that reason, and God, its teacher, have ordered to be obeyed.

The Doctor teaches that temperance is constructive, for the possession of the virtue gives one more entertainment in denying possible pleasures than in lamenting what one has missed (1-2*ae*, *Q.* 35, *a.* 6, *ad.* 3).

It may be materialistic, since it works for the control of the passions and emotions, but it is, nevertheless, a virtue, when it directs this repression to God and happiness, the ultimate cause for self-control and direction (*De Virt. Q.* 5, *a.* 4). One may refrain from eating to reduce weight (and in regard to this St. Thomas opines that more men die from over-eating than from over-fasting), but such a materialistic reason for temperance can only make it a virtue when the sacrifice will directly or indirectly lead to God. Appearances of sanctity may make for earthly cleanliness but they do not record real sanctity unless God recognizes it as the motive of conduct. (2-2*ae*, *Q.* 81, *a.* 8, *ad.* 2).

Temperance directs toward moderation the actions of man in all desires and pleasures of life, both in the species and in the individual. The pleasures about which temperance is concerned are touch, taste, smell and sight, the most important being the sense of touch, rendering food delectable and loveliness of woman more enjoyable. (2-2*ae*, *Q.* 141, *a.* 5).

Among the many subordinate virtues of temperance is shamefacedness. It is an integral part of the virtue of temperance and instills in us a horror for the disgrace that accompanies vices opposed to temperance, prompting us to refrain from sinful acts through fear of reproach (2-2*ae*, *Q.* 145, *a.* 2).

Honesty finds its source in temperance if we ascribe it as a spiritual beauty that directs our conduct and actions in conformity with moderation and reason, just as the beauty of the body is recognized by well-proportioned limbs. This excellence of spiritual beauty is in

accordance with temperance which opposes anything disgraceful (2-2*ae*, *Q*. 145, *a*. 4).

Abstinence is a subjective part of temperance. It resists the passion for food, an agent that disrupts the faculty of reason (2-2*ae*, *Q*. 146, *a*. 2).

Another virtue related to temperance is fasting. It decreases the carnal pleasures, elevates man to spiritual things, and offers atonement for sins (2-2*ae*, *Q*. 147, *a*. 1).

It appears that temperance has more contrary vices than any other virtue. Insensibility is the first. We sin through this vice when we reject pleasure, a necessary operation for life, and deprive ourselves of something essential for the preservation of nature (2-2*ae*, *Q*. 142, *a*. 1).

Intemperance is likened to a childish sin. If left without proper adult guidance a child will disregard all order of reason and become self-willed. Concupiscence, if indulged, will also ignore reason and revel in carnal pleasures. These are acquired pleasures and not necessary for the preservation of life. They are individually voluntary actions performed only in the quest of pleasure and make intemperance a very grievous sin (2-2*ae*, *Q*. 142, *aa*. 2, 3).

One of the great capital sins opposed to temperance is gluttony. This vice separates man from the pursuit of his last end by the inordinate love for pleasures of touch in eating and drinking and leads him into other sins. Partaking immoderately of food and drink dulls the reason and disturbs the brain, diminishing the power of understanding. It disrupts the appetite, leads to false joy, gives rise to loquaciousness and empty speech, and looses the restrain on bodily behavior, provoking lust and impurity (2-2*ae*, *Q*. 148, *a*. 6).

There are, as we have seen, many special virtues of temperance with their corresponding vices. These we will review in detail.

Sobriety preserves the right use of reason by directing proper indulgence in intoxicating drinks (2-2*ae*, *Q*. 149, *a*. 2).

Drunkenness opposes sobriety. It is an immoderate and voluntary indulgence in intoxicating liquors. This vice bares a man to other temptations, weakens his reason, and prevents him from performing virtuous acts (2-2*ae*, *Q*. 150, *a*. 2).

Reason chastises our concupiscence and restricts it. This is the virtue of chastity which is concerned about sexual pleasures although often implied in the word purity. Purity is a circumstance of chastity and arouses shame in participating in the pleasures of sexual sins and in impure looks, kisses and touches (2-2*ae*, *Q*. 151, *a*. 4).

Virginity, a virtue of temperance, perpetually refrains from the greatest bodily pleasure, sexual intercourse. The practice of this virtue is in accordance with right reason, directing the mind toward divine things and diverting it from worldly enjoyments (2-2*ae*, *Q*. 152, *a*. 2).

Lust is the contrary vice of chastity. It is another of the capital sins, the source of many evils. The end of lust is venereal pleasure. Man sins in this manner when he disregards the order of reason in propagating the human race. He may indulge in venereal acts if he pursues the proper end, which is the preservation of the human race and according to the dictates of reason (2-2*ae*, *Q*. 153, *a*. 2).

Continence is a potential part of prudence. With this virtue the reason can resist all passionate desires, especially those pertaining to pleasures of touch belonging chiefly to venereal acts. The seat of continence is in the will. Those who possess this good habit choose by an act of the reason to put aside all passionate desires (2-2*ae*, *Q*. 155, *aa*. 2, 3).

The vice of incontinence is a sin of the soul. The soul gives way to the passions without reflection on the

part of reason, or, if there has been sufficient reflection in the reason, the soul, through weakness, offers no resistance to the passions (2-2*ae*, *Q*. 156, *a*. 2).

Meekness and clemency are auxiliary virtues to temperance. They both restrain evil tendencies. Meekness moderates anger after the laws of reason and clemency tempers punishment by the guidance of reason (2-2*ae*, *Q*. 157, *a*. 3).

Anger opposes meekness. It leads the mind into many inordinate actions and represents the desirability for revenge as a good. It is a venial sin when it retards the judgment of reason, but it becomes mortal if it separates man from his love of God. However, one may be angry in accordance with right reason and then no sin is committed (2-2*ae*, *Q*. 158, *aa*. 1, 3, 6).

The contrary vice of clemency is cruelty. One is guilty of cruelty when he inflicts excessive punishment on another for a fault which does not deserve it (2-2*ae*, *Q*. 159, *a*. 2).

Modesty is a corresponding virtue of temperance. As temperance regulates the greatest pleasures of concupiscence, or those of touch, modesty regulates lesser pleasures where moderation is not required (2-2*ae*, *Q*. 160, *a*. 2).

Humility, as a virtue of temperance, moderates and restrains the mind from aiming at high things. It is found in the appetite. When one practices humility, he knows when he is exceeding his capacity. When one aims to achieve excellence he rejects the will and permits superior judgment to overrule it. An humble man admits his mistakes, considers himself incapable of doing great things, and places others before himself. These are inward signs. The outward signs are, clinging to ordinary methods of working, controlling angry looks and refraining from empty mirth (2-2*ae*, *Q*. 161, *aa*. 2-6).

Pride, a capital sin, is the contrary vice of humility. It is an inordinate desire for individual excellence and

is also the cause of various other sins for it despises God and creates immoderate desires for material things. The fount of this vice is in the irascible faculty. It aims to attain some perfection in either sensible or spiritual things and is, therefore, a part of either the sensitive or intellective appetite. Man sins through pride when he estimates his own good far above the good of others, and when, by making himself prominent, he despises others. Contempt of God is the real act of pride and makes it the most grievous of sins. In other sins man scorns God either through weakness or ignorance, but in pride this aversion of God lies in the very nature of the sin (2-2*ae*, *Q*. 162, *aa*. 2, 4).

Pride was the sin of our first parents. They inordinately desired a special good which was not in harmony with right reason. They wished to be like God in knowing good and evil by their own natural powers so that they could be creators of their happiness. Through the sin of our first parents man's reason lost control over his concupiscible faculty and his soul the power of his body, from which results sickness, death and other bodily defects—the punishment for the sin of pride (2-2*ae*, *Q*. 164, *a*. 1).

The devil tempted both the intellective and sensitive powers when he persuaded our first parents to sin; the intellect by promising knowledge similar to God's, and the senses by tempting man through woman (2-2*ae*, *Q*. 165, *a*. 2).

Studiousness belongs to the virtue of temperance. It regulates the desire of the soul for knowledge. To be studious one must first apply the mind to knowledge and from this application knowledge directs studiousness into other channels (2-2*ae*, *Q*. 166, *a*. 1).

When one pursues study for the pride of knowing, learns something to make it an occasion of sin, forsakes a good subject for one not so good, seeks knowledge from a forbidden source (learning future events from evil

spirits), or learns truth beyond his powers to know it, he sins by curiosity. One may also sin in a sensitive way through curiosity when the sensitive knowledge is diverted to some trivial consideration, or when it is drawn to some vicious thing, such as a lustful look (2-2*ae*, *Q.* 167, *aa.* 1, 2).

There is a virtue about games that bears a relation to temperance. The outward movements of the body are directed by a moral virtue so long as they are within the command of reason. Both the soul and the body require rest, for they are finite and their operations are limited to a certain degree of work. Just as rest is required to relieve the weariness of the bodily organs, so also is rest necessary for the soul. This rest must be in the form of some pleasure whereby the close application of reason may be relaxed. The pleasure must not include any sinful deeds or conversations. It should be excessive enough to overcome the mind. In the indulgences of these pleasures one's actions should be regulated and determined according to the persons, time, place and circumstances (2-2*ae*, *Q.* 168, *a.* 2).

Within a limited degree we have attempted to outline the importance of the virtue of temperance and its affiliated good habits with their contrary vices in the teachings of St. Thomas. From the prominence accorded this virtue in the works of Aquinas its influence on life and relation with morality and intelligence cannot be overestimated. The intellectual virtues and their connection with our problem next claim our attention.

CHAPTER IX

The Intellectual Virtues

In our treatment of the intellectual virtues throughout this chapter we shall avoid emphasizing their connection with the theological virtues and select only those observations from St. Thomas that are suggestive to students who wish to disregard the supernatural. Theological virtues (Faith, Hope and Charity) are a gift and can be either conferred on the ignorant, as in the case of St. Catherine of Sienna, or withheld from the learned, as in the case of Cardinal Newman. St. Thomas recognizes those who draw a sharp line between moral conduct that is under or outside Divine law but does not sacrifice his two principles which state the supremacy of divinely and efficiently enlightened intelligence and the advantage of intelligence without Divine standards.

We are told that moral qualities or virtues are the greatest of goods (1*d.* 1, *L.*), far surpassing any other object of life's activity. An act of virtue comprises four elements, namely, *knowledge,* choice, good object and permanence (1-2*ae, Q.* 100; 2-2*ae, Q.* 58, *a.* 1). Some virtues are given more merit than others. We call these virtues supreme because they demand intelligence and education accompanied by good judgment, qualities which young children do not possess and, therefore, lack these virtues (2, *d.* 27, *a.* 1, *ad.* 3). The virtues that help directly to the attainment of good morals are superior to those that simply withdraw us from evil conduct. "It is more perfect to obtain good than to lack evil. Wherefore, those virtues like faith, hope, charity, likewise prudence and justice, which direct one to good simply, are absolutely greater virtues . . . " (2-2*ae, Q.* 157, *a.*

4). The intelligence that is highest is capable of the highest virtue. "Seminaria virtutum in suprema parte animae, sunt digniora virtutibus quae sunt in partibus inferioribus animae" (3, *d.* 33, *Q.* 1, *a.* 2, *Q.* 2, *ad.* 3).

When speaking of intelligence, St. Thomas means the act of the active intellect, and of understanding as the idea in the passive intellect (Mercier-Manual of Schol. Phil). Intelligence must have a commanding rank when St. Thomas believed intellectuality and thinking habits to be at the base of those habits that make for happiness, bringing closer his idea of material happiness, or conduct tested according to eternal values. "Virtues or habits that have a spiritual or immaterial good as their objective (like the intellectual virtues) are more noble than virtues that have only temporal goods in mind" (2-2*ae*, *Q.* 136, *a.* 2).

Following out the general principle of the learned Doctor, that the intellect is man's highest faculty, we may assume the intellectual virtues to be greater than the moral virtues due to the superiority of intelligence over the reason. Moral virtues may outlive intellectual virtues if sobriety perdures over faith but their lasting quality is no measure of their superiority (1-2*ae*, *Q.* 53, *a.* 1, *ad.* 3). "Science is not taken away by movement of the body, if we consider the root itself of the habit, but only as it may prove an obstacle to the act of science; in so far as the intellect, in its act, has need of the sensitive powers, which are impeded by corporal transmutation. But the intellectual movement of the reason can correct the habit of science, even as regards the root of the habit. In like manner a habit of virtue can be corrupted—Nevertheless, when it is said that *virtues are more lasting than learning,* this must be understood in respect, not of the subject or cause, but of the act: because the use of virtue continues through the whole of life, whereas the use of learning does not."

In drawing a distinction between moral and intellectual virtues we are told that the two principles of actions in man are the intellect and the appetite, and every good act results from a perfection of either of these principles. If the appetite is perfected by a virtuous habit it is a moral act, and if it is the speculative or practical intellect that is made better the virtue is called intellectual (1-2*ae*, *Q*. 58, *a*. 3).

The intellectual virtues are inclined to those things which bring complete happiness, or union with God. "Intellectual virtues are about those things whereby man is made happy; both because the acts of these virtues can be meritorious, and because they are a kind of beginning of perfect bliss, which consists in the contemplation of truth" (1-2*ae*, *Q*. 57, *a*. 1, *ad*. 2).

"The virtues of the speculative intellect are those which perfect the speculative intellect for the consideration of truth: for this is its good work. Now, a truth is subject to a two-fold consideration—as known in itself, and as known through another. What is known in itself, is as a *principle*, and is at once understood by the intellect: wherefore the habit that perfects the intellect for the consideration of such truth, is called *understanding*, which is the habit of (first) principles.

"On the other hand, a truth which is known through another, is understood by the intellect, not at once, but by means of the reason's inquiry, and is as a *term*. This may happen in two ways: first, so that it is the last one in some particular genus; secondly, so that it is the ultimate of all human knowledge. And: since *things that are knowable last from our standpoint, are knowable first and chiefly in their nature* (*Phys*. 1); hence that which is last with respect to all human knowledge, is that which is knowable first and chiefly in its nature. And about these is *wisdom*, which considers the highest causes, as stated in Metaph. 1. Wherefore it rightly judges all things and sets them in order, because there

can be no perfect and universal judgment that is not based on the first causes—But in regard to that which is last in this or that genus of knowable matter, it is *science* that perfects the intellect. Wherefore, according to the different kinds of knowable matter, there are different habits of scientific knowledge; whereas there is but one wisdom" (1-2*ae*, *Q*. 57, *a*. 2).

These intellectual virtues are not connected with one another but there is a relation between them. "Science depends on understanding as on a virtue of higher degree: and both of these depend on wisdom, as obtaining the highest place, and containing beneath itself both understanding and science, by judging both of the conclusions of science, and of the principles on which they are based" (1-2*ae*, *Q*. 57, *a*. 2, *ad*. 3).

There are two divisions among the intellectual virtues, one including the speculative and the other containing the practical. The speculative are made up of wisdom, understanding and science, and the practical are prudence and art, with the former having precedence over the latter (1-2*ae*, *Q*. 68, *a*. 7).

Moral virtues are essentially perfected by the stamp of intelligence and *reason* in the lower appetites (*De Verit*. *Q*. 24, *a*. 4, *ad*. 8), and the intellectual virtues are related to morality and moral science in so far as their operations fall under the domain of reason (3, *d*. 25, *Q*. 1, *a*. 4, *Q*. 2, *ad*. 2).

The intellectual virtues and their contrary vices are an interesting study. We shall review them in detail.

Understanding is the chief intellectual virtue. Man requires the gift of understanding, a supernatural light, in order that he may comprehend things which he cannot know by natural light, for natural light is a finite power and inadequate for seeking full knowledge of things. This virtue is had only by those in the state of grace when the will is rightly inclined toward good, its object, and is understood (2-2*ae*, *Q*. 8, *a*. 1).

Those without sanctifying grace are deprived of the gift of understanding. They are not moved by the Holy Ghost toward a right knowledge of the end and are ignorant of the greatest good (2-2*ae*, Q. 8, *a.* 5).

Cleanness of heart has a relation to this intellectual gift of understanding. Virtues and gifts of the appetitive power cleanse the heart of an excessive love of worldly things and create a desire to see God. This desire removes all phantasms and errors and prepares the mind for the real truths about God, a state resulting from the gift of understanding (2-2*ae*, *Q.* 8, *a.* 8).

Knowledge is also an intellectual virtue. We must have this gift to acknowledge the faith. This virtue is a correct judgment on the things to be believed and those not to be believed (2-2*ae*, *Q.* 9, *a.* 1).

Another intellectual virtue is wisdom. It pertains to the highest cause, or God, and those who know God possess wisdom (2-2*ae*, *Q.* 9, *a.* 2). It is a correct judgment about all things pertaining to God, a result of the right use of reason and to an intimate relation to the thing judged. A man who is familiar with the science of morals makes an investigation by means of the reason and arrives at a correct judgment in regard to something pertaining to chastity, but a man who has formed a habit of chastity cannot arrive at a correct judgment by means of his relationship with chastity. When reason makes an investigation about divine things, it is the intellectual virtue of wisdom that reaches a perfect conclusion. This virtue is a gift of the Holy Ghost. It arises from the will from where chastity comes, but the intellectual virtue of wisdom begins in the intellect. We find wisdom in charity, a love of God, which cannot exist with mortal sin. Where the one reigns, the other is lacking (2-2*ae*, *Q.* 45, *aa.* 2-4).

All of these virtues have their particular opposing vices and it will not be out of place to consider them here in detail.

Unbelief is one of the greatest sins committed against morals. It separates man from God and perverts a true knowledge of Him. This vice arises in the intellect through dissent, the provoker of the sin and the proper and proximate principle promoting the act. Natural good of unbelievers is the only means by which they can perform good acts, but these do not proceed from grace and merit no spiritual benefits (2-2*ae*, *Q*. 10, *a*. 2).

Blasphemy is a vice disparaging God and His goodness. It has its inception in the intellect or in thought, and is known as blasphemy of the heart. There is also an outward expression of this sin called blasphemy of the tongue. It is a mortal sin, opposed to divine charity, the first principle of the spiritual life (2-2*ae*, *Q*. 13, *a*. 2).

Blindness of mind is a corresponding vice of the virtue of understanding. This sinful act turns our will away from what is right and intelligible and preoccupies it with other things. It has a sister vice termed dullness of mind which creates in us a love for things of the flesh enervating our minds and stripping them of all interest for things spiritual (2-2*ae*, *Q*. 15, *a*. 2).

Blindness of mind is the result of lust, dullness of mind is due to gluttony. They are the strongest of all bodily pleasures. Our minds are diverted from holy and thoughtful subjects and our intellectual operations are disorganized, a state which can be remedied only by a total abstraction from sensible phantasms (2-2*ae*, *Q*. 15, *a*. 3).

Despair is a most grievous sin. It resents the true opinion of the intellect which holds that God offers salvation to all mankind and pardons all sinners. It signifies an aversion from God and a refusal to hope for a share of His goodness. This sin finds its source in the love of sexual pleasures, or lust, which nullify all desire for spiritual things. It also springs from sadness or sloth which disrupts every ambition toward the

attainment of an arduous good and retards an impulse to seek anything virtuous (2-2*ae*, *Q*. 20, *a*. 4).

Presumption leads man to believe that he can achieve a good by his own power when he needs the assistance of God. For example, seeking pardon of one's sins without repentance. This offense arises from pride and vain-glory—by seeking vain-glory in an attempt to gain things beyond our power and having an estimation of ourselves as to believe that God will not punish us for our sins (2-2*ae*, *Q*. 21, *a*. 1).

Hatred is a sin that debases the will by an inordinate love of sinful pleasures so that it cannot bring itself under the subjection of God's justice which prohibits sin and punishes the wicked. Hatred of our neighbor comes from envying his good which appears as evil and displeases us (2-2*ae*, *Q*. 34, *aa*. 1, 6),

Sloth opposes the charity of God. It is an avoidance and weariness of some apparent evil which in reality is good. It is a mortal sin when it influences the reason and creates in it a dislike for the Divine good. This is the result of the pleasures of the flesh ruling over the spirit (2-2*ae*, *Q*. 35, *a*. 3).

Envy, another opposite vice of charity, is a longing for another's good, his honor and esteem. It is a painful sensation to us to behold in our neighbor the qualities that we lack (2-2*ae*, *Q*. 36, *a*. 1).

Discord is an antagonist of peace, a deliberate and a willing separation from an acceptance of the Divine or a neighbor's good. It is often caused by the inordinate love of the opinions in one's own will (2-2*ae*, *Q*. 37, *a*. 1).

Contention accompanies discord. Traveling by word of mouth, it is the opponent of truth and the child of pride. One holds, by words, to his own opinion rather than acknowledge the opinion of others (2-2*ae*, *Q*. 38, *a*. 2).

Folly is the vice opposite the virtue of wisdom. This sin dulls the senses and removes all feeling from the

heart. Lust is the progenitor of folly for it immerses the mind and the senses in material pleasures and renders them incapable of judging spiritual things (2-2*ae*, *Q*. 46, *a*. 3).

After having pursued the study of the more important virtues in the teachings of St. Thomas, we obviously arrive at some conclusion in relation to their connection with our question. We have placed these conclusions in the final chapter.

CHAPTER X

Conclusion

We have endeavored in the preceding chapters of this dissertation to prove that a real connection does exist between morality and intelligence and to show the importance of this relation to the study of practical problems in modern social group life. It was our purpose to direct present scientists and others interested in the question to the writings of St. Thomas Aquinas and to point out in the chapters of his works the leads that would assist them in finding a solution to this problem. We could not discuss to any great length the principles of his doctrine concerning this affiliation of morality with the intellect—that would be impossible within the limits of this treatise. We did not analyze each virtue in detail but we selected prudence and temperance on account of their close kinship with our subject. Justice might have been treated since it is an ever-pressing problem around social and ethical purposes (*Besiade—"La Justice Générale"—Melanges Thomistes*), but it was not chosen because of the length of the treatise in St. Thomas and for the reason that its principles are implied in what we have said concerning the other virtues. Virtues and vices are inter-related from the psychological and physiological point of view for they are resident in the faculties and "actus passio et dispositio unius potentiae est causa talium in alia potentia" (*De Malo, Q.* 8, *a.* 3, *ad.* 6) (*De Virtutibus, Q.* 1, *a.* 10, *ad.* 10). The fact that all acts proceed from one soul source creates a relation between the different virtues. Drawing power from one outlet diminishes it for service in another as the use of a pressing iron or a moving picture machine will absorb most of the electric

current and dim the lights. This example shows the effect of one virtue upon another (1-2*ae*, *Q.* 37, *a.* 1). The knowledge of vices depends on the knowledge of virtues (2-2*ae*, *Prol.*). For that reason little comment has been made on vices since St. Thomas holds that if one is imbued with good habits he will be familiar with the evils working for their disintegration. Our purpose was not to give everything Aquinas said about all the virtues but to offer what we thought essential for those who would find the analysis of virtue, moral qualities and intelligence necessary for future sociological research. It was believed best to sacrifice many helpful allusions and expansions lest they lose their value in many minds because they are moral injunctions. We do not want to weaken the value of the assistance of the doctrine of St. Thomas by antagonizing those who would be repelled by moral suggestions. Billuart, the greatest commentator on the writings of the Angelic Doctor, excuses himself from making explanations of the treatise on virtues since it is so clear and thorough in its whole composition. We will be content if we have aided those who are handicapped in discovering the answer to the practical difficulties of our twentieth century socialization by indicating to them where the truth may be found.

In order to support our contention that St. Thomas connects careful mentality with good morality we have perceived scattered throughout his works some conclusions that focus around our main idea and would serve as Thomistic axioms on the relation between morality and intelligence. Isolated from their various tracts, these statements comprise in our belief his general philosophy of our problem.

I. The Supremacy of Right Thinking.

a. Any habit that makes a man choose right is a virtue (4. *Sent. d.* 14, *qq.* 1, 2) because the principle element in virtue is choice (2-2*ae, Q.* 134, *aa.* 3, 4).

b. Wherever right thinking is impeded there is need for a special virtue (2-2*ae, Q.* 149, *aa.* 1, 2).

c. Knowledge is impeded by inattention, contention and inane glory (*Job.* 6).

d. Judgment, a form of intelligence, is weakened in a sinner by carnal pleasures and passions (2-2*ae, Q.* 162, *a.* 4, *ad.* 1) (*De Verit. Q.* 24, *a.* 10) (*Ibid. a.* 11).

e. Intellectual action is necessary to moral virtue (3 *Sent. d.* 33, *Q.* 2).

f. Intellectual action is two-fold, in the intellect itself or in some other function when guided by the intellect (1*a, Q.* 112, *a.* 1, *ad.* 1).

g. Virtue is a moral quality of the mind (1-2*ae, Q.* 55, *a.* 4), and in the irascible and concupiscible faculty is nothing more than conformity with reason (1-2*ae, Q.* 56, *a.* 4).

h. Human acts are beautiful when the splendor of reason shows forth (1 *Cor.* 11, *Chap.* 2).

i. Qualities that are not moral destroy the practical reason more than the speculative or theoretical (3, *d.* 27, *a.* 1, *ad.* 1).

j. In virginity, while integrity of body is more honorable integrity of mind is more essential (2 *Sent. d.* 20, *QQ.* 1, 2, *ad.* 1).

k. In the mind virginity and modesty are found essentially, in the body, materially (2-2*ae, Q.* 152, *a.* 1, *ad.* 1).

l. Sexual intercourse absorbs reason (1-2*ae, Q.* 34, *a.* 1, *ad.* 1; *Q.* 34, *a.* 1, *ad.* 2; *Q.* 72, *a.* 2, *ad.* 4) (2-2*ae, Q.* 53, *a.* 2, *ad.* 2). Also twenty other refer-

ences to this doctrine may be found in his various works

m. Sorrow, sadness and intense pleasure retard intelligence and thought, but when in moderation they aid thought (1-2*ae*, *Q.* 37, *a.* 1).

II. The Influence of Immorality and Intelligence.

a. Virginity makes man like the angels, who are closest to God in intelligence (1 *Cor. Chap.* 7, *lect.* 5).

b. Chastity helps intelligence and intelligence helps chastity (2-2*ae*, *Q.* 15, *a.* 3), because there are seven things which chastity needs in its fight against luxury, namely, mortification of the flesh, *thinking of divine things and prayer, study of the scriptures, holy meditation,* work, control and solitude (*Opusc.* 18, *c.* 19).

c. Cleanness of heart is allied with the gift of understanding by which the mysteries of faith are grasped (2-2*ae*, *Q.* 8, *aa.* 1-3).

d. A man submersed in animal pleasure cannot see the things of God (1 *Cor. Chap.* II, *Cc.* 14).

e. Youth, tossed by passions, is not apt in knowledge of exalted truth and must wait until passion is quieted before arriving at wisdom and prudence (7 *Physic. C.* 20).

f. Moral virtues, especially chastity, do much for acquisition and use of science (2-2*ae*, *Q.* 15, *a.* 3; *Q.* 148, *a.* 6; *Q.* 180, *a.* 3) (2 *Sent. d.* 7, *Q.* 2, *ad.* 6; 4 *Sent. d.* 33, *Q.* 3, *a.* 3).

g. The intelligence resulting from contemplation of divine truth makes us despise human riches, while voluntary poverty helps thought (4 *Sent. d.* 24, *Q.* 3, *a.* 1, *q.* 1).

h. Virtuous action may be wanting in an individual either because he has no inclination to it or

is not able to execute the inclination (*De Malo, Q.* 7, *a.* 2, *ad.* 16).

i. An action may be either virtuous or vicious when it is said to come from such a habit or is like such a habit (*De Malo, Q.* 2, *a.* 4, *ad.* 11).

j. Action in virtue and vice counts for more than possibility. It is not what one can do but what one does (1-2*ae, Q.* 71, *a.* 3).

k. The same physical act may assume different aspects of morality in different people and under different conditions. Giving alms to the poor may be a vice in some while a virtue in others. A passion for scientific research may be a praiseworthy habit for one but a sin for another (1-2*ae, Q.* 1, *a.* 3, *ad.* 3). St. Thomas repeats this statement at least eight times in the Summa Theologica and twelve times in his various other works.

l. The knowledge of the difficulties in self-control and virtue excites attention and arouses intelligence (1-2*ae, Q.* 4, *a.* 8).

m. The perfection of prudence and every intellectual virtue consists in the abstraction from sensile things (2-2*ae, Q.* 15, *a.* 3).

n. The greater the intellectual isolation from the sensuous the better understanding results (*Ibid.*).

o. Sloth engenders weak-mindedness and "evagatio mentis" (butterfly mind). "Spiritual goods which are the object of the sorrow of sloth, are both end and means. Avoidance of the end is the result of *despair* while avoidance of those goods which are the means to the end, in matters of difficulty which come under the counsels, is the effect of *faint-heartedness,* and in matters of common righteousness, is the effect of *sluggishness about the commandments.* The struggle against spiritual goods

that cause sorrow is sometimes with men who lead others to spiritual goods, that is called *spite;* and sometimes it extends to the spiritual goods themselves, when a man goes so far as to detest them, and this is properly called *malice.* In so far as a man has recourse to external objects of pleasure, the daughter of sloth is called *wandering after unlawful things.*'' These are the six daughters of sloth with their mental connections (2-2*ae, Q.* 35, *a.* 4, *ad.* 2).

p. Sloth as mental inanition can be induced by virtue for those who abstain virtuously become mentally dull at noon-day (2-2*ae, Q.* 35, *a.* 1, *ad.* 2).

q. St. Thomas denotes his appreciation of reason in moral qualities when he says that the elements of a moral act are four-fold: ''res apprehensa, vis apprehensiva, voluntas, vis exsecutiva'' (*Con. Gen.* 3, *c.* 10.)

r. Most men are evilly inclined and know vicious things better than good things. ''There is a two-fold nature in man, rational nature, and the sensitive nature. And since it is through the operation of his senses that man accomplishes acts of reasons, hence there are more who follow the inclination of the sensitive nature, than who follow the order of reason: because more reach the beginning of a business than achieve its completion. Now, the presence of vices and sins in man is owing to the fact that he follows the inclination of his sensitive nature against the order of reason'' (1-2*ae, Q.* 71, *a.* 2, *ad.* 3).

s. Sense knowledge has for its purpose two objects. ''In the first place, both in man and in other animals, it is directed to the upkeep of the body, because by the knowledge of this kind, man and other animals avoid what is harmful to them, and seek those things that are necessary for the

body's sustenance. In the second place, it is directed in a manner special to man, to intellective knowledge, whether speculative or practical. Accordingly, to employ study for the purpose of knowing sensible things may be sinful in two ways. First, when the sensitive knowledge is not directed to something useful, but turns man away from some useful consideration. Secondly, when the knowledge of sensible things is directed to something harmful, as looking on a woman is directed to lust: even so the busy inquiry into other people's actions is directed to detraction. On the other hand, if one be ordinately intent on the knowledge of sensible things, by reason of the necessity of sustaining nature, or for the sake of the study of intelligible truth, this studiousness about the knowledge of sensible things is virtuous'' (2-2*ae*, *Q.* 167, *a.* 2).

t. Abstinence assists man in striving toward perfection in science and knowledge (2-2*ae*, *Q.* 15, *a.* 3).

III. The Socializing Influence of Virtues.

a. Friendship is not really a special virtue but derives its source from all the virtues (2-2*ae*, *Q.* 3, *a.* 3, *ad.* 1). It is tested by three conditions, ''novitas, prosperitas and adversitas'' (*Opusc.* 61, *c.* 14).

b. Virtue is the foundation of friendship. ''Charity causes devotion, inasmuch as love makes one ready to serve one's friend, and at the same time charity feeds on devotion. Even so all friendship is safeguarded and increased by the practice and consideration of friendly deeds'' (2-2*ae*, *Q.* 82, *a.* 2, *ad.* 2).

c. Friends should succor one another more in loss of virtue than in loss of material goods (2-2*ae*, *Q.* 25, *a.* 6, *ad.* 2).

d. All the virtues make for sociability since they make a man more affable (2-2*ae*, *Q*. 23, *a*. 3, *ad*. 1).

e. Though all men may not have the full content of all virtues, they have enough of them to admire the virtuous. "According to the same likeness of potentiality to its act, the illiberal man loves the man who is liberal, in so far as he expects from him that which he desires. The same applies to the man who is constant in his friendship as compared to one who is inconstant. For in either case friendship seems to be based on usefulness. We might also say that although all men do not have these virtues in the complete habit, yet they have them according to certain seminal principles in the reason, in force of which principles the man who is not virtuous loves the virtuous man, as being in conformity with his own natural reason" (1-2*ae*, *Q*. 27, *a*. 3, *ad*. 4).

f. Man is guided in his thought by his affectations (1*a*, *Q*. 18, *a*. 2, *ad*. 1).

g. Brutes seem to possess some virtues (1-2*ae*, *Q*. 24, *a*. 4, *ad*. 3).

h. Certain passions are stronger in animals than in man. "We may consider in man both the natural temperament on the part of the body and the reason. On the part of the bodily temperament, a man, considered specifically, does not naturally excel others either in anger or in any other passion, on account of the moderation of his temperament. But other animals, for as much as their temperament recedes from this moderation and approaches to an extreme disposition, are naturally disposed to some excess of passion, such as the lion in daring, the hound in anger, the hare in fear, and so forth. On the part of reason, however, it is natural to man both to be angry and to be gentle: in so far as

reason somewhat causes anger, by denouncing the injury which causes anger; and somewhat appeases anger, in so far as the angry man does not listen perfectly to the command of reason" (1-2*ae*, *Q.* 46, *a.* 5, *ad.* 1).

i. Gregalia animalia, as the doves, are social by natural instinct, for it is physically better for them. But man acts, and more so, because he has reason (1 *Cor.* 11, *lec.* 4).

j. The gift of wisdom is not the cause of love but the effect of it (2-2*ae*, *Q.* 45, *a.* 6, *ad.* 2).

k. "Civitas est hominum multitudo, alicujus societatis vinculo colligata, quae virtute vera redditur beata" (*Opusc.* 20, *Lib.* 4, *c.* 18).

l. There is no real connection between virtue and temporal possessions, they are not the rewards of virtue and the lack of them is not the punishment of sin (1-2*ae*, *Q.* 87, *a.* 7).

St. Thomas recognized the complexity of any problem connected with intelligence when he said, "the acts and relations of the human mind proceed to infinity" (1*a*, *Q.* 28, *a.* 4, *ad.* 2; 1-2*ae*, *Q.* 4, *a.* 1, *ad.* 3), but from all of these conclusions we deduce that in any one individual there must be an *ultimate* connection between the way he thinks and the way he acts. Immorality may be found in clever thinkers, but finally, sometimes in this life and surely in the next, moral qualities will produce the highest kind of understanding (1-2*ae*, *Q.* 51, *a.* 3).

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NOTE—Explanations of abbreviations in the works of St. Thomas:

I. Summa Theologica. Divided into three parts with supplement, the second part sub-divided into two parts. Each part is divided into questions and each question into articles followed by answers to objections.	1a—Prima Pars 1-2ae—Prima Secundae 2-2ae—Secunda Secundae 3a—Tertia Pars Supp.—Supplementum Q.—questio a.—articulus ad.—responsiones
II. Commentaria in IV Libros Sententiarium. Each book is divided into distinctions which are also divided into questions and these in turn are divided into articles often followed by "questiunculae."	1 Sent.—1 Liber Sententiarum 2 Sent.—2 Liber Sententiarum 3 Sent.—3 Liber Sententiarum 4 Sent.—4 Liber Sententiarum Dist.——Distinctio Q.—Questio a.—articulus q.—questiucula
III. Summa Contra Gentiles. Divided into four books, each book divided into chapters.	Con. Gen. L.—Liber c.—caput
IV. Questiones Disputatae. The following works are included in the Questiones.	QQ. Disp.
a. De Veritate	De Verit.
b. De Potentia	De Potent.
c. De Anima	De Anima
d. De Malo	De Malo
e. De Virtutibus in communi	De Virt.
V. Quodlibeta	Quod.
VI. De Regimine Principum	De Reg. Princ.
VII. Commentaries on the Books of Aristotle:	
a. In VIII libros Physicorum	Physic.
b. In III libros de Anima	Anim.
c. In XII libros Metaphysicorum	Meta.
d. In X libros Ethicorum	Eth.
e. In IV libros Politicorum	Polit.
VIII. Commentaries on Sacred Scripture:	
a. Expositio super Mattaeum	in Matt.
b. Expositio super Marcum	In Marc.
c. Expositio super Lucam	In Luc.
d. Expositio super Joannem	In Joan.
e. Expositio super Epistolam ad Romanos	In Rom.
f. Expositio super primam ad Corinthios	I Cor.
g. Expositio super Epistolam ad Hebraeos	In Heb.

These commentaries are divided into Chapters	c.—caput
Lessons	lec.—Lectio
IX. Various Letters:	
Opuscula	Opusc.

VITA

Joseph Earl Bender was born in Altoona, Pa., September 24, 1899. He completed his elementary studies in St. John's parochial schools of his native city. After being graduated from the Altoona High School he entered Mount Saint Mary's College, Emmitsburg, Md., where he received a Bachelor of Arts degree in June, 1921. In July of the same year, after taking a competitive examination, he was awarded a Knights of Columbus Fellowship in the Catholic University. The following September he enrolled as a graduate student, pursuing courses in Thomistic Philosophy under Doctor Smith, O. P., Social Psychology and Personality under Doctor Pace, Sociology under Doctors Kirby and O'Grady, Education under Doctors Jordan and McVay and American Constitutional History under Doctor McCarthy. In June, 1922, the Master of Arts degree was conferred upon him by the University.

To his several professors he expresses sincere appreciation for the kindly interest they have shown toward him and especially to his major professor, Doctor Smith, teacher and friend, he is most particularly grateful.

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